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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we develop a dynamic CGE model to examine the impact of CAFTA on production, 
employment and poverty in Honduras. We model four aspects of the agreement: tariff reductions, quotas, 
changes in the rules of origin for maquila and more generous treatment of foreign investment. We first 
show that trade liberalization under CAFTA has a positive effect on growth, employment and poverty but 
the effect is small. What really matters for Honduras is the assembly (maquila) industry. CAFTA 
liberalized the rules of origin for imports into this industry. That raises the growth rate of output by 1.4% 
and reduces poverty by 11% in 2020 relative to what it would otherwise have been. Increasing capital 
formation through an increase in foreign investment in response to CAFTA has an even larger impact on 
growth, employment and poverty.  
These simulations say something important about the growth process in a country like Honduras 
in which it seems reasonable to assume that there is underemployed,  unskilled labor willing and able to 
work more at a fixed real wage. In such an economy changing the structure of demand in favor of sectors 
that use a lot of unskilled labor will have a big impact on growth. That is what the maquila simulation 
does, because maquila uses a lot of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor and capital. Alternatively the 
supply of capital can be increased by increasing the rate of capital formation. Either of these two has a far 
larger impact on growth and poverty than tariff reductions alone.  
Key words:  CAFTA, Honduras, growth, poverty, CGE model  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is one of the key components of the trade 
reform agenda in Central America.
1  Producers in the region gain preferred access to the U.S. market for a 
wide range of products; at the same time, tariffs and nontariff barriers protecting them from lower cost 
U.S. products are reduced. Supporters of CAFTA hold that the reduction of most remaining barriers to 
trade between the Central American countries and the United States will lead to greater efficiency, 
increased exports, and higher growth rates for the region. Yet many observers remain skeptical about the 
supposed benefits of CAFTA. They point out that for agricultural commodities Central America already 
has been granted preferred access to the U.S. market under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, signed in 1983 
and broadened under several later agreements. Some feel that under the CAFTA agreement the 
protections afforded to their own farmers, particularly smallholders and producers of basic commodities 
such as beans, corn, pork, chicken and rice, will be significantly reduced. The loss of these protections 
could negatively affect the incomes of the poor, offsetting all or part of the gains elsewhere in the 
economy. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this debate, first by looking closely at the 
agreement to see what the changes in protection and access to the U.S. market mean for Honduras. 
Second, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a microsimulation model to simulate 
the impact that the CAFTA changes in tariffs and quotas are likely to have on producers, wages, national 
income, and poverty in Honduras.  
                                                      
1 CAFTA originally included five Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. The treaty was later expanded to include the Dominican Republic (DR).  
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2.  PATTERNS OF PROTECTION AND TRADE PRIOR TO CAFTA 
In order to appreciate the likely impact of CAFTA on the economy of Honduras, it is useful to look at the 
level of protection prior to CAFTA and also at production trends in key sectors of the economy. Table 1 
displays statistics on trends in production and tariffs since 1990. As can be seen in the right hand 
columns, Honduras underwent a fairly dramatic period of trade liberalization in the early 1990s—well 
before the CAFTA agreement. In 1990, Honduras had the highest tariffs in Central America; five years 
later its tariffs were the lowest in the region. Based on this history and given the relatively low level of 
tariffs in 1999, it seems likely that CAFTA’s impact will not be too great. However, its impact on 
particular sectors and commodities could be high, especially where levels of protection were still high in 
2005 when the CAFTA agreement was signed. To get a sense of how important that could be, one has to 
look at the disaggregated tariff data in detail, which we shall do in a moment. But first consider the 
sectoral production and trade data in Table 1.  
 Table 1. Honduras National Account Data 
Tariff Data 
Year Average  Dispersion 
1990 0.419  0.218 
1995 0.097  0.075 
1997 0.097  0.054 
1999 0.081  0.078 
Source: Lederman, Perry, and Suescun 2002.   
Trade liberalization does not appear to have been much of a boon to the Honduran economy. 
Between 1990 and 2004 per capita income rose by just 0.5 percent per year, one of the slowest growth 
rates in all Latin America. This performance did not reflect low investment. Indeed, according to the 
table, trade liberalization was accompanied by a significant increase in the share of capital formation in 
gross domestic product (GDP). Nor was it due to a failure to increase exports. The export share increased 
slightly over the decade when measured in current prices and much more when measured in constant 
prices. Rather, the opening of the economy led to a massive increase in the import share, which was not 
balanced by an equivalent increase in exports, leading to an increase in the trade deficit.  
Looking at trends in the sectoral composition of output, it is evident that the share of agriculture 
contracts sharply and manufacturing increases. Both reflect the rise of the maquila sector. Honduras has 
the largest and fastest growing maquila sector in Central America. By 2005, maquila comprised 27 
percent of total exports, and its value added contributed 36 percent to industrial production (Banco 
Central de Honduras 2006). Meanwhile agriculture managed to grow by only 1.3 percent per year after  
  3
1995, reflecting low prices for its main export crops, natural disasters, and an exchange rate increasingly 
affected by maquila.  
Honduras does not have high tariffs on industrial commodities. Thus the CAFTA tariff reductions 
will primarily affect agriculture. Yet, as the table indicates, this is a sector that had already suffered a 
severe decline in the years before CAFTA. Whether the positive effect of opening the United States to 
Honduran exports will offset the negative effect of further reducing tariffs on agricultural commodities in 
Honduras is a key question to be answered in this paper.  
 Trade Liberalization under CAFTA 
The CAFTA treaty specifies precisely how tariffs on all commodities traded between the signatories are 
going to be eliminated or reduced over time. For each country, the agreement contains a long and detailed 
list of commodities, including both the current most favored nation (MFN) tariff and a tariff category to 
which the commodity has been assigned.
2 These categories determine how fast tariffs will be reduced 
over time. Table 2 shows the categories that are relevant to Honduras. 
Table 2. Tariff categories under CAFTA 
Category   
A  Immediate tariff reduction to zero 
B  Linear reduction of tariffs to zero over 5 years 
C  Linear reduction of tariffs over 10 years 
D  Linear reduction of tariffs over 15 years 




F  Ten-year grace period, then linear reduction to zero over the next 10 years 
G  Goods in this category already have zero tariff rate 
H  Goods in this category are excluded from tariff reductions under CAFTA, with tariffs remaining at the 
rates agreed to in WTO 
M  Nonlinear reduction in tariffs to zero: 2% in 1
st year, 8% per year from 3
rd to 6




N  Elimination of tariffs in 12 equal annual steps 
O  Six-year grace period and then elimination in 9 nonlinear steps: 40% from 7
th to 11




P  Ten-year grace period, then elimination over 7 years: 33% from 11
th to the 14
th year, and 67% from the 
15
th to the 18
th year. 
Source:  CAFTA-DR Treaty 
For a subset of sensitive agricultural products, CAFTA also expands a system of tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs) originally set up under the World Trade Organization (WTO), which define amounts of certain 
                                                      
2 The reader should note that formally CAFTA only reduces Honduran tariffs on goods imported from the United States. In 
this paper, for simplicity, we treat the CAFTA tariff reductions as if they applied to all imported commodities.  This implies that 
our estimates of the effects of tariff reductions overstate the impact. The reason for this simplifying assumption is that the tariff 
rates are so low that the differences between the true effect and the estimates are necessarily small.   
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commodities that can be imported free of tariffs.
3  In addition, for many products, safeguard provisions 
permit a country to apply the MFN tariff level if imports from the United States to that country, or 
imports from the country to the United States, exceed the safeguard level. Safeguards are provisions 
permitted under WTO (and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) by which imports beyond the 
safeguard level can be temporarily restricted if the affected industry can show that it will suffer serious 
injury. In most cases, the safeguard-level tariffs fall over time.  
 Changes in the Protection of Agriculture-Based Products under CAFTA 
We now turn our attention to changes in the level of protection of agricultural commodities under CAFTA 
(Table 3). Once the CAFTA commodities are divided into categories according to the time profile of 
programmed tariff reductions under the agreement, the amount of trade in each of the tariff categories for 
all agricultural and processed agricultural products can be determined, as well as the level and changes in 
the average tariff in each of the categories. For example, in category A, tariffs are eliminated 
immediately, while in B they are reduced to zero in five equal installments over the first 5 years and in C 
over the first 10 years. Note that these are all weighted averages of individual tariff rates, where the share 
of the commodity in total imports determines the weight. It is well known, however, that this method of 
averaging can seriously underestimate the average level of protection, when tariffs are so high that they 
choke off imports. The last category in each table is comprised of all the commodities that have quotas, 
which in Honduras is mainly yellow corn, chicken, and dairy products. 
 Certain commodities, like beans, corn, and rice, are of particular importance to either income or 
consumption of the poor or both. We use the information on tariff categories and initial tariffs in Table 2 
to calculate the time path of tariff reductions for a number of these politically sensitive commodities and 
show the results in the second half of Table 3. Note that the table shows only the tariff level, not the 
impact of quotas, which will be discussed later.   
Other than white corn in several countries, tariff protection for all of these sensitive products will 
disappear over the next 20 years. But for most products, liberalization will be very gradual; much of it 
occurring at least 10 years after the treaty goes into effect. This is important. In Central America, many 
have protested that CAFTA will hurt small farmers by reducing protection of commodities of particular 
importance to smallholders and the poor. The evidence in the table makes it quite clear that this will not 
be the case, at least for the first 5 to 10 years. It seems that the Honduran negotiators of CAFTA were not 
willing to impose a shock treatment on the producers of these sensitive commodities. But it is also clear 
that over the long run, the reductions in tariffs for these commodities are considerable. Domestic 
producers are given a fairly long time to adopt new crops or new and more efficient production 
                                                      
3/ These are products that are politically sensitive because they are or produced or consumed by the poor.  
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techniques. But in the long run, they will have to adjust to a far lower level of protection, particularly in 
rice, beans, poultry, and dairy products.  
The table also makes clear the high level of protection afforded to domestic producers of sensitive 
products, particularly dairy, poultry, and rice.
4  This pattern may, at least to some extent reflect the desire 
of Central American governments to protect their producers from subsidized exports from the United 
States. A recent study estimated that subsidies in the United States amounted to 41 percent of the value of 
production of rice, 50 percent of milk, and 32 percent of corn (Monge, Sagot, and Gonzalez 2004).  
Table 3. Tariff levels over time in CAFTA 
  Trade  Average Tariff Rates  Tariff 
Categories 














year   
A  26000  192298  365  0.127  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000   
B  5908  30360  124  0.140  0.112 0.000 0.000  0.000   
C  15670  9227  175  0.166  0.149 0.000 0.000  0.000   
D  16685  50656  137  0.147  0.137 0.098 0.049  0.000   
F  78  10  7  0.150  0.150 0.150 0.150  0.075   
G  107545  830  235  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000   
N  4510  0  10  0.139  0.127 0.081 0.023  0.000   
O  869  379  4  0.150  0.150 0.150 0.090  0.00   
Quota  50482  1514  33  0.416  0.416 0.416 0.416  0.277   
Total  227747      0.136  0.119 0.107 0.097 0.060.0
9
 
Total without rice and yellow corn  0.072           
 
        Tariffs on sensitive commodities 
















Yellow  corn  0.450  0.450 0.450 0.302  0.000  0.000 
White  corn  0.450  0.450 0.450 0.450  0.450  0.450 
Rice  0.450  0.450 0.450 0.450  0.252  0.000 
Beans  0.150  0.140 0.103 0.050  0.000  0.000 
Beef  0.150  0.120 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pork  0.150  0.150 0.150 0.090  0.000 
000
0.000 
Poultry  0.549  0.520 0.455 0.411  0.230  0.000 
Dairy  0.121  0.118 0.116 0.113  0.055  0.000 
Source:  Morley 2006. 
Tariffs in categories A and B are either eliminated immediately or over the first five years of the 
agreement. Products in these categories broadly include prime cuts of beef, fish, flowers, various fresh 
fruits and vegetables, potatoes, and inputs to processed foods such as soups and dog food. For the most 
                                                      
4/ This pattern is observed both in Honduras and in other Central American countries (Morley 2006).  
  6
part, these are not products in which U.S. imports compete with local producers. For fish, fruits, and 
vegetables, it is unlikely that U.S. prices would be competitive with local products, even at a zero tariff. 
The picture in beef is more complicated. Central American cattle growers do not now produce prime cuts 
of beef, so the increase in tariff-free imports should have little effect on local producers. In fact, because 
CAFTA grants beef import quotas in the United States, the treaty is on balance likely to be favorable to 
them.  
Category C commodities are those with a 10-year linear tariff reduction schedule. This group is 
composed primarily of processed foods. D and F category commodities have a gradual reduction of tariff 
protection over either 15 or 20 years. Thus whatever impact CAFTA will have on producers in these two 
categories will necessarily be quite drawn out. The bulk of D category products are what could be called 
processed agricultural commodities, such as animal or vegetable fats, candies and other products made 
from sugar, products made from chocolate, leather, flour, beverages, and vegetables or fruits. In 
Honduras, the category also includes potatoes and some beans. The F category where there is a 10-year 
grace period followed by a 10-year tariff elimination is composed completely of dairy products.  
The table tells us that the treatment of different agricultural commodities under CAFTA is 
anything but uniform. More than half of imports either had no protection prior to CAFTA (category G) or 
had tariff rates set to zero upon ratification of the agreement. A second group of commodities will have 
their tariffs lowered, but the process will be quite gradual. Finally, for several sensitive commodities such 
as white corn, rice, poultry, and dairy products, tariffs are either not lowered at all, or not lowered 
significantly until at least 10 years after ratification.  
We now allocate these tariff reductions across the sectors that we are going to use in the CGE-
based simulations presented later in the paper (Table 4). As in the previous tables, the average tariffs 
shown are the weighted averages of individual commodity tariffs, where the weights are the import shares 
of the commodities in question.  The table gives a good idea of which sectors still had high levels of 
protection prior to CAFTA and how that protection is slated to change over the next 20 years. Trade 
liberalization in the 1990s reduced protection in all manufacturing sectors other than textiles and 
processed foods to a low level. Other than textiles, all the sectors that had significant tariffs were 
agricultural, which means that for the most part, further trade liberalization under CAFTA will primarily 
affect agriculture. Tariffs go to zero in all sectors by year 20, but the process is not uniform. As we saw in 
Table 3, liberalization for subsistence commodities does not begin until almost 10 years after ratification. 
Protection drops rapidly for textiles and bananas, but since these are both export sectors, it is not clear 
how important this change in protection really is.   
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Table 4. Changing tariff rates over time by sector 
 Year 
Commodity Base  year  tariff  1  5  10  15  20 
Bananas  15.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Coffee  12.22  8.83 5.67 1.70 0.00  0.00 
Sugar  14.16  13.19  9.33 4.51 0.00  0.00 
Mining  4.07  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Livestock  4.30  2.18 1.37 0.35 0.00  0.00 
Lumber  0.52  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Nontraditional  exports,  vegetables  and  fruit  12.40  7.58 3.84 0.28 0.00  0.00 
Animal  and  vegetable  oil  5.31  4.66 3.30 1.61 0.00  0.00 
Subsistence agriculture *  15.91  14.97  12.90  10.90  5.46  1.87 
Processed  food  **  9.27  5.18 3.84 2.57 0.87  0.00 
Textiles  13.44  0.71 0.40 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Paper  5.38  2.80 1.18 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Chemicals  4.16  1.17 0.63 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Metal,  machinery,  and  minerals  4.64  2.48 1.30 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Other  manufactures  7.83  5.05 1.99 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Electricity,  water,  and  gas  6.87  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Construction  8.26  2.93 1.63 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
* Includes grain and beans;  
**Includes fish, beverages, tobacco, and dairy  
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3.  MODELING THE IMPACT OF CAFTA ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION 
To predict the impact of CAFTA on the Honduran economy, we use a recursive dynamic general 
equilibrium model, in order to incorporate the general equilibrium effects of the changes introduced by 
CAFTA on prices, output, and employment across different sectors of the economy. As we have already 
seen, trade liberalization under CAFTA is mainly limited to tariff reductions in various agricultural 
commodities. Those changes will obviously affect prices, output, and employment in agriculture. But they 
will also have indirect effects on urban consumers, government revenue, prices, the balance of payments, 
and the exchange rate, which well may be larger than the direct effect of the tariff reductions in 
agriculture as well as second-round effects. In this chapter, we give a short overview of the model, with a 
complete mathematical and technical discussion relegated to appendixes A through D.  
The Recursive Dynamic CGE Model 
Recursive dynamic CGE models
5 have been used in Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1999) and El-Said, 
Lofgren, and Robinson (2001) to analyze development strategies in Korea and Egypt, respectively; in 
Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2001) as a tool to model changes in poverty resulting from various policy 
alternatives; and finally in Thurlow (2003), who developed a recursive dynamic model for South Africa.  
These models are solved in two stages. In the first stage, a solution is sought for a one-year 
equilibrium using a static CGE model (see Lofgren, Harris and Robinson. 2001). In the second stage, a 
model between periods is used to handle the dynamic linkages that update the variables that drive growth. 
The intertemporal equations provide all exogenous variables needed for the next period by the CGE 
model, which is then solved for a new equilibrium. The model is solved forward in a dynamically 
recursive fashion, with each static solution depending only on current and past variables. The model does 
not incorporate future expectations; instead the behavior of its agents is based on adaptive expectations, as 
the model is solved one period at a time. The variables and parameters used as linkages between periods 
are the aggregate capital stock (which is updated endogenously, given previous investment and 
depreciation), the population, the domestic labor force, factor productivity, export and import prices, 
export demand, tariff rates, and transfers to and from the rest of the world (all of which are modified 
exogenously). The dynamic model used in this research follows the models developed by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
6  
This model for Honduras is solved for 1997 (the base year for the data) and then solved 
recursively year by year until the year 2020. This allows us to compare growth trajectories under different 
                                                      
5 This section of the paper is taken from Piñeiro (2006). 
6 / See Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2001) and Thurlow (2003).  
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policy scenarios and to track changes in policies such as tariff levels, which change slowly over time.  
Most CGE trade models are solved for just the final comparative static equilibrium changes resulting 
from a change in tariffs. Under CAFTA, however, the tariff changes are gradual to give affected sectors 
the time to make adjustments, so tracking the timing of impacts of the changes is an important part of the 
analysis.  
First Step: The Single-Period Solution 
Basic data for CGE models are obtained from a social accounting matrix (SAM). A SAM is a 
comprehensive, economy-wide data framework, typically representing the economy of a country. The 
SAM used in this paper is for 1997 and is based on the SAM developed by Jose Cuesta and reported in 
Cuesta (2005).  
The CGE model has three components. The first shows the payments that are registered in the 
SAM, following the same disaggregation of factors, activities, commodities, and institutions shown in the 
matrix. The second is the equations that represent the behavior of the different institutions present. The 
third is the system of constraints that have to be satisfied by the whole system, including the factor and 
goods markets, the balances for savings–investment, the government, and the current account of the rest 
of the world.  
Each producer maximizes profits under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. There 
are two factors of production: labor (differentiated by skill) and capital. Production is related to factor 
inputs in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, which allows the producers to 
substitute these two inputs until they reach the point where the marginal revenue of each factor equals the 
factor price (wage or rent). The second choice the producers make is the amount of intermediate inputs 
they will use. This specification is made assuming fixed shares that specify the appropriate amount of 
intermediate inputs per unit of output and labor or capital (value added. Finally, output prices depend on 
the value added (cost of labor and capital), intermediate inputs, and any relevant taxes and subsidies. 
Figure 1 shows the flow of a single commodity from producers to final demand. First, goods from 
all producers are aggregated into commodity outputs using a CES product demand system. The aggregate 
output is sold domestically or internationally. The producers’ allocation between domestic sales and 
exports is specified via a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, assuming imperfect 
transformability between exports and domestic sales. The producers will sell their products to the market 
with the highest profitability. The domestic price is the international price times the exchange rate, plus 
any possible export taxes or export subsidies. The domestic good is combined with imports to produce the 
composite commodity. For this the Armington (1969) specification is used, which means that the 
domestically produced and imported goods are imperfect substitutes.   
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Notes: CES is constant elasticity of substitution; CET is constant elasticity of transformation 
In this model, there are four institutions: households, enterprises, government, and the rest of the 
world, which do three things:  produce, consume, and accumulate capital. Households save a constant 
coefficient of their disposable income and buy consumption goods. They own the enterprises and they 
work in them. As a result, household income is the sum of salaries, profits, government transfers, and rest 
of the world transfers. Household consumption of goods and services is determined by a linear 
expenditure system (LES). Firms buy intermediate goods, hire factors of production, produce 
commodities and services, and sell them in the market. Government receives taxes, consumes goods and 
services, and makes transfers to households. The capital account collects the savings from the households, 
firms, government, and the rest of the world and buys capital goods (investment).  
Closures and Assumptions on Factor Supplies 
The closures are the mechanisms that determine how various macro constraints are satisfied. (1) 
Honduras has a flexible exchange rate, which means that foreign savings are fixed. (2) For the 
government, the level of consumption and income taxes are fixed across simulations. (3) In equilibrium, 
total saving must equal total investment. There are various ways to guarantee this. In all but one of our 
simulations, we fix the saving rates of households and government, which relates total saving and 
investment positively to the level of income. (4) In the labor markets, we assume that there is an excess 
supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labor and a fixed real wage rate. We also assume that within each 
period labor is mobile across sectors, which means that real wages are equal across sectors for these two 
types of labor. For skilled labor, a supply curve is added, making wages as well as quantities endogenous 
to the model. (5) Capital is fully employed and sector specific, which means that profit rates are free to 






















Second Step: Between Periods  
In the second step of the recursive model, the linkages between periods are introduced. To do this, we 
solve the static model for one specific year and then update the capital stock, population, domestic labor 
force, factor productivity, export and import prices, and export demand parameters. The updated model is 
then solved again for the following year and so on.  
Total capital accumulation is endogenous (in all but the foreign direct investment [FDI] scenario) 
since it is equal to total saving, which is endogenous. By definition, it is equal to the last period’s capital 
stock plus total investment minus depreciation.
7 The allocation of new capital across sectors is done by 
adjusting the proportion of each sector’s share in aggregate investment as a function of the relative profit 
rate of each sector, compared with the average profit rate of the economy as a whole. Sectors with higher 
(lower) average profit rates will get higher (lower) shares of the available investment. Over time sector 
profit rates should converge.  
The reader should note that our version of dynamic behavior may well understate or overstate the 
full reaction of an economy to changes in policies or conditions. In the model, total investment is 
determined by total saving and is therefore endogenous. But neither the saving nor the investment 
decision is modeled directly. Thus we do not incorporate the possible effect on total capital formation of a 
rise in the overall profit rate in response to CAFTA, for example, or a rise in total saving in response to a 
rise in the interest rate. This limited characteristic of our version of the dynamic reaction to changes in 
CAFTA should be kept in mind in interpreting the results. 
Turning to the supply of labor by skill, the model determines only the amount of employment. It 
does not distinguish between those who are unemployed and those of working age who are not in the 
labor force. This is an important distinction for skilled labor. For unskilled labor, we assume that there 
will be an excess supply of labor up to 2020, which is equivalent to assuming that the rate of growth of 
employment does not exhaust the available stock of either unemployed or inactive unskilled labor.   
For skilled labor, we assume an upward sloping supply curve with an elasticity of +5 with respect 
to the real wage, shifting rightward by 2 percent per year.  In addition to unemployment, Honduras has a 
large pool of well-educated but inactive labor, especially among women. We assume that the growth in 
this group will be high enough up to 2020 to supply the amount of skilled labor called for in our sequence 
of short-run solutions. This assumption may be unrealistic in the FDI scenario because it requires a rapid 
growth rate of employment.  
                                                      
7 / To estimate the capital stock in the base period 1997, we assume a lifetime of 12 years for capital where all the 
depreciation occurs in the final year. With this assumption, the estimate of the capital stock in 1997 is completely independent of 
the assumed initial capital output ratio and depends only on the level of investment observed between 1984 and 1996. The initial 
level of capital turns out to be 2.26 times the level of GDP at market prices. In the dynamic simulations, we set depreciation in 
year t at 8 percent of the capital stock, so that the transition equations at time t depend only on the solution at time t-1.   
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Finally, productivity growth, real government consumption and transfers, world price of exports, 
and current account balances are set exogenously based on observed trends. 
For investment, we have two different treatments depending on the simulation. In the CAFTA 
simulations related to tariff reductions, changes in the maquila scheme, and import quotas, we use a 
savings-driven closure in the single period solution. In the FDI simulation, we impose as a constraint that 
all additions to FDI must be devoted to fixed investment. Therefore, in this simulation, total saving is 
investment driven.  
To summarize, the dynamic accumulation process is updated in three ways: 
1.  by exogenous trends (labor force growth, productivity changes, capital stock growth, and 
population growth); 
2.  by economic behavior (distribution of investment by sector and distribution of labor force by 
sector and category); and 
3.  by implemented policies (changes in tariffs, import quotas, and FDI as a result of the 
implementation of CAFTA. 
For the resulting dynamic model, we first do a forward simulation to 2020 to create what we call 
a base run, in which there are no CAFTA-related changes in exogenous variables.
8  We then run the 
model with various CAFTA policy alternatives and compare those results with the base run. Because we 
may not have completely captured important aspects of dynamic behavior or because of misspecifications 
in the model itself, we put less weight on the absolute values of our projects than we do on the 
comparison of the base run with the various CAFTA alternatives. In other words, we are less confident of 
the growth or employment forecasts of our base run or CAFTA alternatives than we are of the differences 
between them.  
                                                      
8 / For this exercise, we modified the transfers from the enterprises to the rest of the world in such a way that they were 
eliminated by the year 2005 in all the scenarios including the “base.”  
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4.  THE CAFTA SIMULATIONS 
The dynamic model described in the previous section is recursive. It solves the system of equations for all 
the endogenous variables for each period and then updates variables either because they are endogenous 
in the model or because they are policy variables such as tariffs that change over time. In each of the 
simulations, we run the model from its 1997 base, using the observed values for all exogenous variables 
up to 2005, and then insert the changes introduced by CAFTA in 2005 and beyond. We run each 
simulation out to 2020 and present the results in the form of growth rates of all the endogenous variables 
of interest from the 1997 initial values. Each table displays the initial values for each variable and the 
annual average growth rate from 1997 to 2020. There are five simulations. 
Base: This is the projection of the economy without CAFTA. It is our best estimate of how the 
economy would grow in the absence of CAFTA, and therefore it is the counterfactual against which each 
of the CAFTA simulations should be compared.    
Tariffcut1:  In this simulation, we change all the sectoral tariffs according to the time patterns 
shown in Table 4. Since these tariff changes vary across both time and sector, it is useful to show 
explicitly the time path of the response to the changes, rather than just the 23-year average rate of growth.  
Maquila: Textiles are an area of potentially large benefits but equally large and uncertain risks 
because of the expiration of the Multifiber Agreement in January 2005.  In the past, (before 2000) in 
Central America maquila was almost entirely limited to the assembly of clothing from imported inputs. 
Since 1984, when the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act was passed, the maquila industry has 
been exempt from the worldwide quota system then in force. But its products were not exempt from U.S. 
tariffs until the U.S. Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act in 1990. 
With the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, this advantage was 
partially offset by the more generous treatment of Mexican producers with regard to rules of origin. The 
Caribbean Trade Promotion Act (CBTPA), passed in 2000, extended to the Central American countries 
the market access conditions for maquila granted to Mexico under NAFTA, with similar liberalized 
restrictions on rules of origin. Imports of knitted or shaped apparel were permitted into the United States 
free of tariffs, provided the intermediate inputs from the yarn up to the final good were produced in a 
CAFTA country.
9 This has had a major impact on production in Central America. But the CBTPA has a 
sunset provision. It will expire in 2008 unless CAFTA is implemented. What CAFTA does for textiles is 
to make permanent the liberalized rules of origin for inputs to the maquila industry granted temporarily 
under the CBTPA. To model the impact of these provisions of the CAFTA agreement, we keep the level 
of intermediate imports to the textile industry at the observed level of 1997 prior to the passage of the 
                                                      
9/ Tee shirts and socks were subject to a maximum tariff-free import ceiling.  
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CBTPA. Then starting in 2005, we reduce these intermediate imports to the very low levels observed after 
2000. This simulation then shows the positive effect of domestically producing a greater share of the 
intermediate inputs to the booming maquila industry.  
Quotas: For imports into Honduras, certain commodities of particular importance to the poor, 
either as consumers or producers, are given special treatment under CAFTA. Tariffs for these 
commodities were typically quite high prior to CAFTA, and the rate of tariff reduction under CAFTA in 
most cases will be slow, as shown in Table 3. But CAFTA also established TRQs in many of these 
commodities, making liberalization faster than is apparent from the tariff category in which these 
commodities were placed. These are the commodities for which CAFTA could have a significant effect in 
the short run, since CAFTA will permit tariff-free imports up to certain quantitative limits as soon as the 
treaty is implemented (or in the case of chicken legs, in year three). In addition, the United States granted 
tariff-free importation for quantities of certain commodities specifically from Honduras. We now look at 
the most important of these commodities and ask what the impact of the TRQs is likely to be in practice.  
What is the effect of the Honduran quota on domestic prices and producers?  It is easy to show 
that quotas only have an effect on domestic prices and output levels if they are larger than the amount 
previously imported (see Morley 2006) If they are smaller, they are effectively a transfer of tariff revenue 
to the importer. In the Honduras case, yellow corn is the only product where the initial quota is bigger 
than the level of imports. But no yellow corn is produced in Honduras. For pork and chicken legs, the 
quota is approximately equal to the level of imports, but both are quite small relative to the level of 
production, which means that if there is a price effect it must be small. Therefore, in the quota simulation, 
we assume that these quotas have no effect on the domestic price of imports. 
The other possible impact of the quota component of CAFTA is the favorable effect of liberalized 
quotas in the United States for certain Honduran exports. As in the import case, expanded quotas in the 
United States only affect the domestic price and production in Honduras for products for which the 
CAFTA quotas are larger than the current level of exports. That is the case for sugar, beef, and some dairy 
products. The value of the additional quota is equal to the U.S. tariff times the international price times 
the quantity of imports permitted into the U.S. market tariff-free. In addition, when the market-clearing 
domestic price of these commodities changes, the size of the change depends on the size of the liberalized 
quota, compared with the initial level of production. In fact, when we make this comparison, we find that 
the change in the domestic price of these commodities is virtually zero
10. We have therefore not reported 
simulations for the quota changes in the sections that follow.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI): It is relatively straightforward to model the impact of trade 
liberalization under CAFTA. But there are many additional items and agreements under CAFTA that 
                                                      
10/ See Morley (2006) for details.  
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have to do with the treatment of FDI. All are aimed at defining and protecting the rights of foreign 
investors with respect to the protection of intellectual property and expropriation. Many observers see 
these conditions as excessively generous to foreign investors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make 
a complete analysis of the net benefits or costs of these FDI provisions to the Honduran economy. Since 
no one has a very clear idea of just how much additional FDI Honduras can expect to receive under the 
new CAFTA legal conditions, as a first approximation, we simply increase by 25 percent the level of FDI 
that came into Honduras between 2000 and 2004 and keep that increase the same all the way to 2020. 
This gives rise to two effects. The first and less important one is the simple effect on balance of payments 
of an increased inflow of foreign resources. The second and more important effect is on total capital 
formation. These inflows go to capital formation. Therefore, in this simulation, we change our saving–
investment closure to ensure that these inflows directly increase investment.   
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5.  RESULTS OF THE CGE SIMULATIONS  
Our model projects that without CAFTA the Honduran economy would grow at a relatively slow rate of 
3.1 percent per year from its 1997 base up to 2020, or at a slightly lower rate between 2005 and 2020 
because of the large increases in the level of transfers between 1997 and 2005. The model reproduces 
quite well both the observed growth rate and fluctuations in it between 1997 and 2005, which gives us 
some confidence in the simulations of the effects of CAFTA. This low rate reflects three things: first, the 
relatively low rate of investment in the base year; second, the low rate of growth of observed productivity 
in the recent past; and third, the treatment of maquila. We assume no growth in productivity in any of the 
runs reported here. Lifting that assumption has little effect on the comparisons between the base run and 
the CAFTA alternatives.  
Maquila requires further comment. One usually simulates the effect of a change from current 
conditions. The maquila case is different, however, because the favorable treatment for inputs to maquila 
started in 2000 but would have expired in 2008 in the absence of CAFTA. The baseline simulation is our 
best forecast of what the growth rate would be without maquila, while the maquila simulation forecasts 
growth if temporary benefits to maquila were made permanent. Without maquila, growth in Honduras is 
predicted to fall to 3.1 percent per year, whereas the growth rate jumps to 4.5 percent with the conversion 
of the benefits for maquila from temporary to permanent (Table 5).
11 
Table 5. Rates of growth of macroeconomic aggregates in CAFTA simulations 
Base CAFTA  Maquila  Quotas  ALL 
CAFTA  FDI**    Initial 
Value  
1997*  (Annual percentage growth rate 1997-2020) 
Absorption  74.10 3.35 3.47 4.62 3.35 4.72 5.35 
Private  Consumption  50.80 3.33 3.44 4.73 3.34 4.82 5.24 
Fixes  Investment  15.87 3.67 3.81 4.69 3.67 4.81 6.84 
Government  Consumption  5.42  3.42 3.58 4.39 3.43 4.54   
Exports  28.06 2.40 2.64 3.40 2.40 3.60 5.04 
Imports  32.00 3.22 3.40 3.98 3.23 4.13 5.29 
GDP  (market  price)  70.17 3.06 3.19 4.46 3.06 4.57 5.26 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
*in 1997 billion of lempiras 
**FDI is foreign direct investment 
In Figure 2, we show various projections of real GDP at market prices, starting in year 2000. The 
dashed line is the baseline showing our estimate of how Honduras will grow in the absence of CAFTA. 
The remaining lines show the effect of the CAFTA tariff cuts, the liberalization of rules of imports for 
                                                      
11 Masa Watanuki pointed out to us that there is an important difference between data sources on the size of the shift away 
from imported inputs in the maquila industry after 2000. This may have led us to overstate the maquila effect. However we also 
note that we did not assume an increase in maquila exports after 1997 which would tend to bias downward our estimate of the 
maquila effect.   
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maquila, and an increase in FDI.
12 Other than FDI and maquila, each of these effects is positive, but none 
of them is large, particularly tariff cuts and quotas. The tariff cuts, for example, while positive, add less 
than 0.02 percent to the overall growth rate. Higher tariff-free quotas for sugar, beef, and dairy in the 
United States are like a small foreign exchange windfall to the economy. While that windfall is positive, it 
also tends to cause the exchange rate to appreciate, discouraging exports and encouraging imports, both of 
which reduce the net positive impact of the quotas themselves.  
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Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
These results confirm what we should have expected. Past trade liberalization in Honduras 
reduced average tariffs to a level where the further reductions resulting from the CAFTA agreement 
simply are not large enough on average to have much of an impact. On sensitive products such as corn, 
beans, and rice, either the tariff reductions permitted by CAFTA are not large, or they are spread out over 
a long period. In either case, the net effect on the overall growth rate is small. This does not necessarily 
mean that the effect on particular sectors is not large. 
Table 5 shows the rates of growth of the main macroeconomic aggregates in the different 
simulations, assuming that government saving is fixed and that productivity growth continues to be 
zero.
13 The last column on the right shows the combined effect of all of the changes other than FDI, while 
                                                      
12/ We do not show the quota line on the graph because the effect is so small that the line is indistinguishable from the 
baseline projection. 
13/ We also ran a set of simulations where we dropped the assumption of fixed government saving. This change had little 
impact on the results, which means that even though the loss of government revenue from tariffs is significant in an accounting 
sense, whether or not that loss is offset by an increase in other taxes or a higher government deficit makes little difference in the 
overall growth rate or the sectoral composition of output.   
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each of the other columns shows the separate effect of each of the changes. The table confirms what is 
implied in Figure 2. Tariff reductions and liberalization of quotas both have positive effects on growth, 
but the effects are very small. Trade liberalization does make the Honduran economy more open, 
increasing the rates of growth of both exports and imports, but the positive effect on the growth rate of 
GDP is small. 
In contrast, the liberalized rules of origin for maquila do have a significant impact on the growth 
rate of the economy. CAFTA makes permanent the CBTPA rules of origin for the intermediate inputs for 
many lines of textile exports to the United States. In the simulation, we make permanent the sharp 
reductions in imported inputs to the maquila sector that were observed in Honduras after 2000 when the 
CBTPA went into effect. This alone raises the level of output in 2020 by about 38 percent relative to what 
it would have been in the baseline simulation. Maquila alone brings the growth rate up from 3.06 to 4.5 
percent per year. Comparing the ALLCAFTA column in the table with the maquila column, we see that 
virtually the entire positive impact of CAFTA on the growth rate is due to maquila.  
Several other growth patterns should be noted. First the rate of growth of domestic spending or 
absorption exceeds the growth rate of production in all the simulations, which implies that an increasing 
share of domestic spending is supplied by imports in the base line and in all the CAFTA simulations   
Since the rate of growth of exports is less than the growth rate of the economy, this implies an increase in 
the trade deficit. This pattern is misleading. In the base year 1997, there was a large negative transfer 
from Honduras enterprises to the rest of the world. This transfer was eliminated by 2005. In our 
simulation, we adjust the transfer account so that it follows the observed balance-of-payments data. That 
means that there is a large positive change in the transfer account, permitting a rapid increase in imports 
and a decline in exports up to 2005. After 2005, the trade deficit is assumed to be fixed in real terms. 
Since real income is rising, the trade deficit as a fraction of total income is falling. Using a 2005 base, 
exports grow at 4 percent and imports grow at only 2.6 percent in the base simulation. In fact, the rate of 
growth of exports exceeds that of both the economy and the rate of growth of imports after 2005 in all the 
simulations.  
The Impact of CAFTA on Sectoral Growth Rates 
The sectoral growth rates of trade and domestic production  in Table 6 show that trade liberalization 
under CAFTA increases exports, imports, and production in both the primary and secondary sectors. The 
effects are all small but positive. Thus, despite the fears of some that the rise in imports due to falling 
trade barriers would more than offset any expansion in exports, our results suggest that this will not 
happen.   
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The sectoral effects of maquila are more complex. Liberalized rules of origin on intermediate 
inputs in maquila cause a big reduction in imports to the textile industry. On balance, one might expect 
the exchange rate to appreciate, causing exports to fall and imports to rise enough to offset the reduction 
in textile imports. But that is not what happens. Instead, there is a significant increase in national 
production, employment, and demand, which is large enough to require a depreciation of the exchange 
rate to induce more exports and choke off some of the demand for imports.
14  Effectively, the economy 
becomes slightly more closed by import substitution in the textile industry, and the resulting rise in 
employment increases demand and output in all other sectors.  
Table 6. National production and trade 
Base CAFTA  Maquila  Quotas ALL 
CAFTA  FDI**   
Initial Share 
1997*  (Annual percentage growth rate 1997-2020) 
Exports  100.00          
Agricultural  sector  26.53  1.96  2.23  2.64 1.96 2.86 5.01 
Primary  sector  29.18  1.97  2.26  2.63 1.97 2.86 5.01 
Mining  2.65  2.08  2.54  2.55 2.08 2.91 5.09 
Secondary  sector  47.91  2.60  2.86  3.76 2.60 3.98 5.24 
Manufacturing  sector  47.85  2.60  2.86  3.76 2.60 3.98 5.24 
Food  industry  25.74  2.88  3.09  4.27 2.88 4.45 5.47 
Imports  100.00          
Agricultural  sector  9.59  3.29  3.65  4.66 3.39 4.91 5.45 
Primary  sector  20.22  3.16  3.40  4.28 3.16 4.50 5.43 
Mining  10.62  2.94  3.16  3.91 2.94 4.11 5.42 
Secondary  sector  39.68  3.23  3.45  3.44 3.24 3.62 5.35 
Manufacturing  sector  39.44  3.23  3.44  3.43 3.24 3.61 5.35 
Food  industry  0.00  3.57  3.64  4.64 3.58 4.71 5.61 
Production  100.00          
Agricultural  sector  43.18  3.26  3.37  4.57 3.26 4.66 5.39 
Primary  sector  43.21  3.26  3.37  4.57 3.26 4.66 5.39 
Mining  0.03  2.29  2.59  2.90 2.29 3.10 5.17 
Secondary  sector  19.72  3.08  3.24  4.21 3.08 4.35 5.39 
Manufacturing  sector  13.19  2.88  3.05  4.04 2.88 4.18 5.23 
Food  industry  4.88  3.14  3.30  4.43 3.14 4.57 5.51 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
*Initial share of total exports, imports, and production respectively 
**FDI is foreign direct investment 
In Table 7 we show the effects of the different CAFTA simulations on production for all of the 
disaggregated sectors included in the CGE model. The full details of exports and imports by sector in the 
different experiments are relegated to Appendix A, Table A.1. Table 7 helps us to understand why the 
Honduran economy is relatively insensitive to CAFTA. Consider agriculture, CAFTA has a positive 
impact on exports and production of coffee, and bananas, but it has virtually no effect on the subsistence 
                                                      
14/ The import share rises from 40.7 percent in 2005 to 47.4 percent in 2020, and exports grow by 5.3 percent per year after 
2005.  
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part of agriculture (that is, the production of corn, beans, rice, and other commodities produced by the 
poor). Since this subsistence sector comprises over 80 percent of total agricultural production in 
Honduras, agriculture as a whole is insensitive to CAFTA. Similarly, maquila has a large positive effect 
on textiles, but at the base level, production in textiles is not large enough to give the entire manufacturing 
sector a big push forward.  
The fact that the tariff reductions and TRQs granted by Honduras under CAFTA do not cause 
significant price reductions in the short run does not mean that domestic producers will be unaffected by 
the agreement in the long run. In the long run, the level of protection for many important commodities 
will be eliminated. But the tariff reductions are gradual, which will give farmers time to adjust and to 
become more competitive. What will be critical from a policy perspective is that this time is used wisely 
to increase productivity, switch to more profitable crops, and take advantage of the new export 
opportunities opened up by CAFTA.  
Table 7. Production and annual percentage growth rates 
   1997  Share Baseline CAFTA  Maquila Quotas ALL  CAFTA  FDI 
Sector    (Annual percentage growth rate) 
Banana  0.71  1.30 1.72  1.77 1.30  2.13  4.59 
Coffee  1.20  2.23 2.51  2.97 2.23  3.21  6.83 
Mining  0.03  2.29 2.59  2.90 2.29  3.10  6.02 
Livestock  0.91  3.21 3.35  4.74 3.22  4.84  6.39 
Nontraditional 
agriculture  6.94  2.81 2.93  3.86 2.81  3.95  6.15 
Subsistence 
agriculture  33.44  3.41 3.52  4.79 3.41  4.88  6.41 
Food  4.88  3.14 3.30  4.43 3.14  4.57  6.51 
Textiles  2.13  2.96 3.08  4.51 2.97  4.61  6.23 
Paper  1.33  2.51 2.65  3.31 2.52  3.42  6.03 
Chemicals  1.83  2.63 2.78  3.58 2.63  3.69  5.41 
Metals  1.14  2.99 3.12  3.95 2.99  4.05  6.23 
Other manufacturing  1.88  2.50 2.85  3.33 2.50  3.63  5.95 
Electricity, water  1.72  2.93 3.10  4.09 2.93  4.23  6.10 
Construction  4.81  3.63 3.78  4.68 3.63  4.81  7.09 
Commerce  14.10  3.00 3.15  4.01 3.00  4.14  6.61 
Hotels  2.94  2.76 2.92  4.57 2.77  4.67  5.94 
Transport  4.53  2.94 3.15  3.76 2.94  3.93  6.64 
Finance  3.08  2.87 3.00  3.76 2.87  3.87  6.02 
Personal services  1.19  3.01 3.14  3.97 3.01  4.09  6.15 
Government  4.77  2.97 3.07  3.71 2.97  3.79  6.32 
Other services  6.46  3.02 3.13  3.91 3.02  4.01  6.33 
TOTAL  100.00           
Source: Authors’ worksheets.  
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Foreign Direct Investment 
One of the main purposes of the CAFTA agreement is to attract more FDI to Central America by reducing 
or eliminating the risk of expropriation, or other unfavorable actions by national governments that 
specifically target foreign enterprises. These components of the agreement have elicited a good deal of 
unfavorable comment within Latin America because they appear to infringe on the sovereignty of host-
country governments. Our purpose here is not to enter into this dispute but rather to make a rough 
estimate of the effects on the economy of these components of the agreement, assuming that they in fact 
succeed in attracting more FDI. This exercise is somewhat different from what we have done so far, 
because we have no observable econometric basis on which to make an estimate of the response of 
foreign investors to the new CAFTA incentives for FDI. In our FDI simulation, we assume an increase of 
25 percent over the observed capital transfers to Honduras between 2000 and 2004. Furthermore, we 
make all of this increased FDI a net addition to domestic capital formation. In other words, here the 
saving–investment closure is investment driven.  
Consider now what the FDI simulation tells us about the effect of additional inflows of FDI. 
Compare the FDI column in each of the tables 5-7 with the base simulation. By assumption, we are both 
increasing total saving and forcing more of it into investment. As a result the share of investment in GDP 
in 2020 rises to 31.9 percent, compared with only 25.9 percent in the base run. That additional capital 
coupled with the additional employment it induces leads to dramatic increases in production in all sectors. 
Overall the growth rate of the economy jumps from 3.0 to 5.3 percent (see Figure 2). Instead of growing 
by 4.0 percent per year between 2005 and 2020, exports now grow at twice that rate (7.9 percent).  
No one should take these results as a firm prediction of the likely effects of CAFTA on either FDI 
or growth. Rather it is a way of emphasizing the central importance of investment to future growth in 
Honduras under CAFTA. If the more favorable treatment of FDI really does bring in more foreign capital, 
and if that foreign capital is invested in new capital, this will have a dramatic positive effect on the 
development prospects of the Honduran economy.  
CAFTA and Domestic Factor Markets 
Consider next the impact of CAFTA on wages, employment, and the rate of return to capital. The 
available data permit us to disaggregate labor by education, gender, and type of employment (wage versus 
self-employment). Unfortunately, they do not permit a rural–urban breakdown.
15 We have assumed that 
there is an excess supply of labor, both male and female with less than 10 years of education. That implies 
that the base-period level of real wages for these types of labor is fixed. The simulations then determine 
                                                      
15/ In a later paper, we will combine information from a recent household survey with the results reported here to get an 
estimate of the impact of CAFTA on rural and urban incomes.  
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the amount of employment of unskilled or semi-skilled labor that is consistent with the supply of skilled 
labor and capital as well as the other macro constraints.  
The changes in employment of unskilled and semi-skilled labor by gender and labor type in the 
different simulations are presented in Table 8, while Table 9 shows what happens to relative wages. The 
numbers in Table 8 are units of employment normalized by total payments to each category of labor in the 
base year.  
Table 8. Employment by skill and gender 
Male unskilled and semi-skilled wage labor 
 Baseline  TARCUT1  MAQUILA  QUOTA  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Initial Share  7.127 7.127  7.127  7.127  7.127  7.127 
2000 7.711  7.711  7.711  7.711  7.711  7.852 
2005  9.007 9.151 10.318 9.01  10.432 10.134 
2010 10.423  10.682  12.592  10.427 12.831 13.707 
2015  12.095 12.527  15.372 12.102  15.807  18.21 
2020  13.925 14.551  18.612 13.935  19.293  23.99 
Self-employment of unskilled and semi-skilled male labor 
 Baseline  TARCUT1  MAQUILA  QUOTA  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Initial Share  25.624 25.624  25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 
2000 30.165  30.165  30.165  30.165  30.165  28.817 
2005  36.87 37.218  43.09 36.889 43.354 37.357 
2010 41.838  42.458  51.301  41.862 51.843 50.633 
2015 47.771  48.849  61.601  47.807 62.663 67.237 
2020  54.213  55.852 73.475 54.26  75.261 86.381 
Employment of female unskilled and semi-skilled wage labor 
 Baseline  TARCUT1  MAQUILA  QUOTA  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Initial Share  1.368  1.368 1.368  1.368 1.368 1.368 
2000 1.458  1.458 1.458  1.458 1.458 1.461 
2005  1.687  1.712 2.036  1.687 2.052 1.866 
2010  1.966  2.012 2.535  1.966 2.576 2.585 
2015  2.289  2.366 3.132 2.29  3.209 3.449 
2020  2.642  2.754 3.834  2.644 3.957 4.453 
Self-employment of female unskilled and semi-skilled labor 
 Baseline  TARCUT1  MAQUILA  QUOTA  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Initial Share  3.856  3.856 3.856  3.856 3.856 3.856 
2000 4.332  4.332 4.332  4.332 4.332 4.337 
2005  5.154  5.232 6.146  5.156 6.204 5.726 
2010  5.897  6.035 7.461  5.899 7.591 7.657 
2015  6.762 6.989  9.017 6.766  9.252 10.052 
2020  7.71  8.034 10.841  7.716 11.207  12.824 
  
  23
Table 8. Continued 
Skilled labor - male 
 Baseline  TARCUT1  MAQUILA  QUOTA  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Initial Share  6.148  6.148 6.148  6.148 6.148 6.148 
2000 6.482  6.482 6.482  6.482 6.482 6.553 
2005  7.429  7.559 8.346 7.43  8.448 8.193 
2010  8.629 8.852 10.156  8.632 10.351  11.112 
2015  9.97 10.329 12.317 9.975  12.665 14.425 
2020  11.399 11.911  14.747 11.406  15.28  18.126 
Skilled labor - female 
 Baseline  TARCUT1  MAQUILA  QUOTA  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Initial Share  1.812  1.812 1.812  1.812 1.812 1.812 
2000 1.935  1.935 1.935  1.935 1.935 1.933 
2005  2.229  2.255 2.502 2.23  2.521 2.436 
2010 2.58  2.628  3.04  2.58  3.085  3.319 
2015  2.971  3.054 3.664  2.973 3.747 4.322 
2020 3.39  3.51  4.371  3.392 4.5 5.447 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Note:  These are normalized units of employment, not the number of jobs.    
Unskilled and semi-skilled labor in Honduras is concentrated in self-employment in small farms 
in the countryside and in the informal sector in the cities and towns. In the baseline simulation, 
employment growth is slightly higher than the growth rate of the population (3.0 percent for male wage 
labor, 3.3 percent for male self-employed, and slightly less for females in each category. It is assumed 
that there is an excess supply of unskilled labor willing to work at the constant real wage. Under those 
conditions the increase in the supply of capital permits a relatively rapid increase in the employment of 
the unskilled, particularly in the FDI simulation. In all the simulations, the growth rate of employment is 
higher than the expected rate of growth in the supply of unskilled labor, which implies that in the absence 
of CAFTA or some other policy change, the pool of unemployed unskilled labor should fall in Honduras. 
Trade liberalization by itself (TARCUT1 column) has a positive effect, but the total impact is 
small. That is consistent with the relatively small size of the production impacts under CAFTA. As 
before, what does make a difference is maquila. By 2020, maquila will create an additional 22 million 
units of employment for males and 4.3 million units for women, raising the growth of employment for 
both sexes to about 4.5 percent.  Increased FDI also has a significant positive effect for male wage labor. 
That is because of the strong link between investment and the construction sector, which is a large 
employer of unskilled wage labor.  
When one compares wage trajectories or wage differentials by skill category, the results suggest 
that there will be a slight rise in earnings inequality, with or without CAFTA (Table 9). The supply curve 
of skilled labor is projected to rise by 2 percent per year, somewhat less than the increase in the demand  
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for skilled labor. As a result, real wages for the skilled rise in all of the simulations, including the 
baseline.
16  Since wages for the unskilled and semi-skilled are fixed by the assumption of an excess 
supply of labor, there is a decline in the relative wage of the unskilled. In the baseline projection, by 2020 
the unskilled lose 12 percent in wages relative to the skilled. Trade liberalization makes the wage pyramid 
for the employed slightly less equal. That is because it increases the growth rate of employment of the 
unskilled and the wages of the skilled. CAFTA increases the earnings of both the skilled and the 
unskilled, but for the latter the improvements come in the form of more jobs at the same wage, while for 
the former the improvement comes in the form of higher wages only.  
The maquila and FDI simulations accentuate this picture. Both of them increase the growth rate 
of the economy by a significant amount, and as we can see, the faster the economy grows, the faster 
wages of the skilled grow relative to the unskilled. That increases the inequality of earnings. But at the 
same time there is a higher rate of growth of employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled of both sexes. 
The unskilled are better off because more of them have jobs, and the skilled are better off because all of 
them have higher real wages.  
Table 9. Relative real wages by skill in the CGE scenarios for Honduras 
  Initial  share  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Unskilled women         
Baseline  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TARCUT1  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Maquila  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ALLCAFTA  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FDI  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Skilled women         
Baseline  1.000  1.009 1.037 1.070 1.102 1.132 
TARCUT1  1.000  1.009 1.040 1.074 1.109 1.141 
Maquila  1.000  1.009 1.061 1.104 1.149 1.192 
ALLCAFTA  1.000  1.009 1.063 1.109 1.155 1.200 
FDI  1.000  1.012 1.060 1.129 1.190 1.246 
Unskilled men         
Baseline  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TARCUT1  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Maquila  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ALLCAFTA  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FDI  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
                                                      
16/ For the maquila and FDI simulations, we assume that the rate of growth of working-age skilled labor is 2.5 percent per 
year after 2010 to reflect increases in school attendance and higher levels of education in younger age cohorts. This makes the 
participation and unemployment rates consistent with the higher rates of growth of employment called for in these two 
simulations.   
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Table 9. Continued 
  Initial  share  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Skilled men         
Baseline  1.000  1.009 1.037 1.070 1.102 1.132 
TARCUT1  1.000  1.009 1.040 1.074 1.109 1.141 
Maquila  1.000  1.009 1.061 1.104 1.149 1.192 
ALLCAFTA  1.000  1.009 1.063 1.109 1.155 1.200 
FDI  1.000  1.009 1.053 1.123 1.183 1.239 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Capital 
The growth of capital is central to understanding our projections of the likely effect of CAFTA on the 
economy. In Table 10, we show how the stock of capital is expected to grow over time and how the gross 
rate of return to capital changes in the different scenarios. In the baseline simulation, investment starts at 
22.6 percent of GDP and grows to 26 percent by 2020. As a result, there is a slight deepening of capital as 
well as a slight reduction in the rate of return. Trade liberalization (TARCUT1) slightly raises both the 
growth rate of capital and the rate of return. However, the time path of the rate of return is not linear. In 
all the simulations it peaks in 2005. After that, the increased rate of capital formation drives the rate of 
return to capital back toward or below its initial level. Maquila has a big impact on the profitability of 
capital and its growth rate. Upon adoption of the liberalized rules of origin, which we first incorporate in 
the model in 2005, the rate of return to capital jumps from 10 to 15 percent. From 2005 to 2020, the rate 
of growth of capital increases to 4.5 percent per year. That is enough to bring the rate of return back 
toward its initial level, but at much higher levels of employment for the unskilled and higher wages for 
the skilled.  
Table 10. The supply and return to capital 
Supply of capital 
  Initial  share  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Baseline  158.88  165.951 190.374 229.282 272.740 319.541 
TARCUT1  158.88  165.951 190.374 230.238 275.570 325.316 
Maquila  158.88  165.951 190.374 240.576 301.310 370.903 
ALLCAFTA  158.88  165.951 190.374 241.407 304.067 376.942 
FDI  158.88  165.951 212.745 320.673 436.536 569.130 
Rate of return to capital 
Baseline  0.3  0.113 0.118 0.108 0.103 0.099 
TARCUT1  0.3  0.113 0.123 0.133 0.108 0.105 
Maquila  0.3  0.113 0.159 0.144 0.137 0.133 
ALLCAFTA  0.3  0.113 0.163 0.149 0.143 0.138 
FDI  0.3  0.122 0.126 0.097 0.092 0.088 
Source:  Authors’ worksheets.  
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The FDI simulation shows what happens when there is a really rapid rate of capital formation. 
Not only does the rate of growth of the economy increase, but the rate of capital deepening increases. Not 
surprisingly, the rate of capital formation is so high that it drives down the rate of return to below its level 
in year 2000.    
Factor Shares 
To better understand the distributional implications of CAFTA, it is useful to look at what happens to 
factor shares in the various experiments. We know that trade liberalization, maquila, and FDI all increase 
the growth rate of the economy. We know also that the skilled get higher wages, capital a higher rate of 
return, and the unskilled, more jobs. How does all this translate into shares of GDP? Table 11 gives us the 
answers. In the baseline simulation, both skilled and unskilled labor gain relative to capital for which the 
fall in the rate of return exceeds the increase in capital intensity. In the short run, CAFTA benefits capital 
at the expense of both skilled and unskilled labor. In all the simulations in 2005, the capital share rises 
relative to the baseline, especially in maquila and FDI. But that is not the end of the story. We know that 
there is a big increase in capital formation, too. That drives down the rate of return in all the simulations, 
so that by 2020 the share of capital falls from its peak in 2005 and is in fact below its initial level in all of 
the experiments except maquila. 
17 Thus while CAFTA favors capital in the short run, in the longer run 
(to 2020) trade liberalization favors skilled labor at the expense of capital, while maquila favors capital at 
the expense of unskilled labor, which tells us that the rate of growth of employment of the unskilled, even 
though quite large, is not as rapid as the growth rate of the economy. In FDI, the situation is reversed. 
Here the decline in the profit rate after 2005 and the increase in employment are so rapid that both skilled 
and unskilled labor gain at the expense of capital.  
                                                      
17/ Note that the experiment called ALLCAFTA is dominated by maquila.  
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Table 11. Factor shares as percentage of GDP at factor cost 
   Initial share  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020 
Unskilled and semi-
skilled labor 
Baseline  0.59 0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
 TARCUT1  0.59 0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.59 
 Maquila  0.59 0.60  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.58 
 Quota  0.59 0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
 ALLCAFTA  0.59 0.60  0.57  0.58  0.57  0.57 
 FDI  0.59 0.58  0.56  0.59  0.60  0.60 
Skilled labor  Baseline  0.12 0.12  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.13 
 TARCUT1  0.12 0.12  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.13 
 Maquila  0.12 0.12  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.12 
 Quota  0.12 0.12  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.13 
 ALLCAFTA  0.12 0.12  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.12 
 FDI  0.12 0.12  0.11  0.13  0.14  0.14 
Capital Baseline  0.28 0.29  0.28  0.28  0.27  0.27 
 TARCUT1  0.28 0.29  0.29  0.28  0.28  0.28 
 Maquila  0.28 0.29  0.31  0.30  0.30  0.30 
 Quota  0.28 0.29  0.28  0.28  0.27  0.27 
 ALLCAFTA  0.28 0.29  0.28  0.31  0.31  0.30 
 FDI  0.28 0.31  0.32  0.28  0.27  0.26 
Source:  Authors’ worksheets.  
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6.  CAFTA AND GROWTH DYNAMICS IN HONDURAS 
Honduras has been stuck on a slow growth trajectory for many years. The results here suggest that 
CAFTA will not do much to change that unless it leads to a significant increase in capital accumulation. 
The trade liberalization measures contained in the agreement do have a positive effect on growth and 
employment, but the effect is small. As a result of trade liberalization in the 1990s, tariff barriers simply 
are not high enough to have a large impact on growth when they are dismantled.  
What are these CGE results telling us about growth dynamics and a growth strategy for 
Honduras?  In this study, Honduras is treated as an economy constrained by the available supply of 
skilled labor and capital. The country can obtain higher levels of output or higher growth rates or both by 
shifting factors of production to more productive uses, by employing more of the excess potential supply 
of unskilled labor, or by raising the rate of capital accumulation or human capital formation. Except for 
the FDI scenario, we did not change the rate of capital accumulation. Our tariff-cut scenario tells us that 
the impact of shifting scarce factors between sectors in response to changes in tariffs does not produce 
much additional growth, either because the levels of protection prior to CAFTA were not large or because 
the allocation of capital and skilled labor was already close to optimal. In a word, there is not too much to 
be gained by eliminating Harberger triangles.  
Maquila is different. It shifts some of the total supply of human and physical capital to a sector 
with a relatively high demand for unskilled labor, which increases the growth rate even with a constant 
total supply of capital. That is because it puts more of the potential but unused supply of unskilled labor 
to work. Productivity-enhancing investments in agriculture might well do the same thing. Indeed any 
growth strategy that increases the demand for unskilled labor, holding constant the supply of 
complementary factors, would increase output and growth.  
The FDI scenario reminds us of how large an impact can be obtained by increasing the growth 
rate of capital in the economy. If FDI really does increase in response to CAFTA to the degree that we 
assume in our CAFTA experiment, the impact on the Honduran economy will be dramatic. Both 
economic growth and employment of the unskilled could double. While this is undoubtedly an overly 
optimistic projection, it does point to the critical role of increasing the rate of capital formation and 
technical progress in the Honduran economy.  From a growth perspective, the crucial challenge for 
Honduras is to create conditions that will attract more capital, both domestic and foreign.  
CAFTA improves employment prospects for the unskilled. Our simulations assume an excess 
supply of unskilled labor. In all the CAFTA simulations, job creation is positive, small in the case of trade 
liberalization but substantial for maquila and FDI. At the same time, since there is an increase in the 
demand for skilled labor, wage inequality increases. Thus CAFTA increases the earnings of both skilled  
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and unskilled labor. The unskilled are better off because more of them have jobs, and the skilled are better 
off because all of them have higher real wages. We look more closely at the distributional implications of 
CAFTA in the next section. 
In the short run, CAFTA benefits capital at the expense of both skilled and unskilled labor. In all 
the simulations in 2005 the capital share rises relative to the baseline, especially in maquila and FDI. But 
that is not the end of the story. It turns out that in the longer run, increases in capital formation drive down 
the rate of return, so that by 2020 the share of profits in GDP is below its initial level in all but the 
maquila experiments. In the long run trade liberalization favors skilled labor at the expense of capital, 
while maquila favors capital at the expense of unskilled labor. For FDI, the decline in the profit rate after 
2005 and the increase in employment of the unskilled is so rapid that both skilled and unskilled labor gain 
at the expense of capital.  
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7.  THE IMPACT OF CAFTA ON POVERTY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Our dynamic CGE model estimates the effect that CAFTA will have on employment, production, and 
income. What implications do those changes have for poverty and the distribution of income?  To answer 
those questions we have to find a way to translate the labor market outcomes of the CGE into a 
distribution of income across households. That is, the CGE provides information about employment 
creation and wages for individuals, whereas individuals must be treated as members of households for 
distributional and poverty purposes. Thus if the CGE tells us that a certain number of additional jobs have 
been created, we have to decide which formerly unemployed individuals will get those jobs and which 
families they come from. The same problem arises if we are interested in the effect of a change in the skill 
composition of the labor force. The CGE solution, for example, may tell us that there is an increase in the 
share of the labor force that is skilled. We then need a way of deciding which members of which families 
have upgraded their skills.  
Following a microsimulation methodology developed by Vos and Paes de Barros,
18 we use a 
household survey as close as possible to the base year of the CGE to get a base-period distribution of the 
labor force across the households represented in the survey. First, the labor force is divided among the 
various skills represented in the CGE model, and rates of unemployment for each are calculated. Second, 
random numbers are assigned to the group, which will shrink in size, and that group is ranked according 
to random numbers. For example, if the model calls for an increase in employment, random numbers are 
assigned to the unemployed. Then the procedure moves down the ranked list of the unemployed until a 
sufficient number have been found to reach the amount of employment given by the CGE solution. Third, 
working with the newly simulated labor force by type, we repeat the procedure to change the skill or 
sectoral composition of that labor force. Finally, the wage of the newly composed labor force is changed 
in accordance with the CGE solution. At this point, the new labor force with the new wage structure is 
reassembled into the households from the base-period survey and new levels of household income per 
capita as well as poverty and income distribution statistics are calculated.   
Two things about this procedure should be noted. First, the selection of individuals to be moved 
from one labor category to another is entirely random, not based on any behavioral model. This is not 
entirely satisfactory from a theoretical point of view. To remedy that defect, the procedure is duplicated 
50 or 100 times and the statistical results tabulated. That is intended to test the validity or sensitivity of 
the results to the particular choice of individuals who are moved from a contracting to an expanding 
group. We can then report not only the mean of the various trials, but also the standard errors and 
confidence intervals. In the Honduras case, we repeated these simulations 100 times. Second, the solution 
                                                      
18/ See their description of the method in Vos, Taylor, and Paes de Barros (2002).  
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we are proposing is sequential. That is, we start with unemployment, adjusting it to obtain a new labor 
force determined by the CGE model; then we change the sector and skill level of that new labor force and 
finally the wage. That seems like the right order, but it is possible that the solution would be different if 
we had chosen a different sequence of changes.  
Results of the Microsimulations 
For an overview of the results of the microsimulations, we show various poverty and distribution statistics 
for the baseline and each of the four alternate scenarios reported in previous sections of this paper (Table 
12). Starting from the 2004 base determined by a household survey from that year, we do 
microsimulations for the years 2010, 2015, and 2020, of which only the first and last are reported in the 
table. The table reports average labor and per capita income, distribution statistics, and the three Foster, 
Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (the poverty index, the poverty gap and the severity of 
poverty) for both extreme and moderate poverty. The two poverty lines are calculated by CEPAL on the 
basis of national household surveys, adjusted by changes in the cost of living between 2002 and 2004.
19  
Standard errors and confidence intervals for the key poverty and distribution statistics for each of the 
simulations for year 2020 are reported in Table 13.  
In the baseline scenario, without CAFTA, the model predicts that poverty will fall from 70 
percent in 2004 to 66.4 in 2020, with slightly larger percentage reductions in extreme poverty and the 
poverty gap and slightly larger improvements for the urban poor than for the rural poor (Table 12). All of 
these changes are significant (Table 13). According to the simulations, per capita income is expected to 
rise by 0.7 percent per year, which implies that poverty elasticity in this baseline scenario is only –0.5. 
Growth does help the poor but not as much as it does in many other countries.  
Because of the increase in relative wages for the skilled and the faster rate of growth in the urban 
sector, there is a slight increase in income inequality. The changes are small and they are largely confined 
to the urban sector.  
To consider the effect of CAFTA on poverty and inequality, we compare the figures for 2020 for 
each of the CAFTA scenarios with those of the base line for that year. According to the model, CAFTA 
unambiguously helps the poor, both rural and urban—an important result. Tariff cuts alone reduce the 
national poverty incidence—rural and urban—by roughly 1.0 percentage point. They also appear to 
reduce extreme poverty more in the rural than in the urban sector, with the incidence of rural extreme 
poverty falling by 1.5 percentage points, compared with only 1.0 percentage point in the urban sector. All 
of these changes are statistically significant (Table 13). 
                                                      
19/ For the urban sector, the poverty and extreme poverty lines are equal to $88 and $42 in US dollars. For the rural sector, 
the two lines are $55 and $28. All of these are relatively high lines by the standards of countries at the Honduras level of 




Table 12. Changes in poverty and distribution under CAFTA 
   2004 2010  2020 
    Baseline  TARCUT1  Maquila  ALLCAFTA  FDI  Baseline TARCUT1 Maquila ALLCAFTA  FDI 
National                     
Labor income  3349.1 3402.9  3405.1  3406.4  3409.4  3431.6 3469.5  3477.4  3463.9  3470.4  3449.3 
Theil - labor income  0.93 0.95  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.94 0.96  0.96  0.95  0.95  0.95 
Gini - labor income  0.63 0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64 0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64 
Per capita household income  1643.7 1715.1  1728.9  1811.8  1828.3  2065.2 1833.3  1880.9  2115.0  2165.0  2602.6 
Poverty incidence  70.07%  68.79%  68.47%  66.16% 65.80% 59.76%  66.38%  65.33%  59.10% 57.99% 50.84% 
Poverty gap  40.68%  39.35%  39.03%  36.83% 36.48% 30.99%  37.13%  36.08%  30.38% 29.48% 24.35% 
Poverty severity  28.77%  27.60%  27.33%  25.40% 25.09% 20.47%  25.67%  24.76%  19.95% 19.25% 15.28% 
External poverty incidence  45.27%  43.75%  43.37%  40.60% 40.20% 33.41%  40.90%  39.71%  32.62% 31.50% 25.46% 
External poverty gap  23.81%  22.69%  22.42%  20.56% 20.26% 15.91%  20.83%  19.95%  15.41% 14.78% 11.29% 
External poverty severity  16.08%  15.21%  15.00%  13.57% 13.35% 10.10%  13.79%  13.12% 9.75%  9.31%  6.85% 
Theil - per capita household income  1.03 1.03  1.02  0.99  0.99  0.93 1.02  1.01  0.94  0.93  1.02 
Gini - per capita household income  0.65 0.65  0.65  0.64  0.64  0.62 0.65  0.65  0.62  0.62  0.63 
                      
Rural                     
Labor income  1879.3 1910.4  1915.3  1952.6  1959.9  2048.0 1957.3  1973.8  2061.5  2072.4  2129.4 
Theil - labor income  1.01 1.00  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.94 0.99  0.99  0.94  0.94  0.91 
Gini - labor income  0.64 0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.63 0.64  0.64  0.63  0.63  0.63 
Per capita household income  879.6 916.2  923.5  977.5  990.7  1142.0  980.5  1008.5 1170.1  1200.3  1467.8 
Poverty incidence  79.54%  78.32%  78.03%  75.66% 75.15% 68.91%  75.88%  74.85%  68.06% 66.80% 59.20% 
Poverty gap  50.20%  48.65%  48.34%  45.79% 45.21% 38.75%  46.01%  44.79%  37.85% 36.76% 30.65% 
Poverty severity  37.02%  35.58%  35.29%  32.95% 32.44% 26.72%  33.15%  32.05%  25.93% 25.03% 20.03% 
External poverty incidence  59.54%  57.76%  57.38%  54.16% 53.49% 45.26%  54.24%  52.87%  44.08% 42.70% 35.12% 
External poverty gap  33.17%  31.69%  31.39%  28.99% 28.46% 22.74%  29.20%  28.06%  21.93% 21.07% 16.27% 
External poverty severity  22.74%  21.56%  21.32%  19.44% 19.04% 14.67%  19.62%  18.73%  14.09% 13.46% 10.01% 
Theil - per capita household income  0.99 0.98  0.97  0.93  0.92  0.83 0.95  0.93  0.83  0.82  0.89 
Gini - per capita household income  0.63 0.63  0.63  0.62  0.62  0.59 0.62  0.62  0.59  0.59  0.59 
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Table 12. Continued 
   2004 2010  2020 
    Baseline  TARCUT1  Maquila  ALLCAFTA  FDI  Baseline TARCUT1 Maquila ALLCAFTA  FDI 
Urban                     
Labor income  4779.9 4847.5  4841.2  4793.3  4800.4  4732.0 4923.6  4915.6  4790.7  4791.5  4687.5 
Theil - labor income  0.74 0.76  0.76  0.77  0.77  0.79 0.79  0.79  0.82  0.82  0.84 
Gini - labor income  0.58 0.58  0.58  0.59  0.59  0.60 0.59  0.59  0.60  0.60  0.61 
Per capita household income  2462.7 2571.4  2592.2  2706.1  2726.3  3054.8 2747.5  2816.2  3128.0  3199.1  3819.1 
Poverty incidence  59.90%  58.55%  58.20%  55.96% 55.76% 49.93%  56.16%  55.10%  49.47% 48.53% 41.86% 
Poverty gap  30.45%  29.36%  29.03%  27.20% 27.10% 22.66%  27.59%  26.72%  22.35% 21.66% 17.60% 
Poverty severity  19.91%  19.03%  18.77%  17.29% 17.21% 13.76%  17.64%  16.93%  13.53% 13.03% 10.17% 
External poverty incidence  29.94%  28.70%  28.31%  26.03% 25.93% 20.69%  26.57%  25.57%  20.30% 19.48% 15.08% 
External poverty gap  13.76%  13.02% 12.79% 11.51%  11.44%  8.58%  11.84% 11.23%  8.41%  8.03%  5.94% 
External poverty severity  8.93% 8.39%  8.21%  7.27%  7.23%  5.19% 7.54%  7.09%  5.09%  4.85%  3.47% 
Theil - per capita household income  0.88 0.88  0.87  0.85  0.86  0.82 0.88  0.87  0.83  0.83  0.92 
Gini - per capita household income  0.60 0.60  0.60  0.59  0.59  0.58 0.60  0.60  0.58  0.58  0.59 
Source:  Authors’ worksheets 
Table 13. Standard errors and confidence intervals for poverty and distribution estimates in 2020 
   Baseline-2020  TARCUT1-2020 Maquila-2020  ALLCAFTA-2020  FDI--2020 











National                   
Labor income  3469.5  3469.1 3469.8 3477.4 3477.1 3477.7 3463.9 3463.6 3464.2 3470.4 3470.1 3470.6 3449.3 3449.0 3449.5
Theil - labor income  0.963  0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.947 0.947 0.947
Gini - labor income  0.640  0.640 0.640 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.640 0.640 0.640 0.638 0.638 0.638
Per capita household income  1833.3  1833.1 1833.4 1880.9 1880.8 1881.1 2115.0 2114.9 2115.2 2165.0 2164.8 2165.1 2602.6 2602.5 2602.8
Poverty incidence  66.38%  66.33% 66.42% 65.33% 65.29% 65.37% 59.10% 59.04% 59.15% 57.99% 57.93% 58.05% 50.84% 50.77% 50.91%
Poverty gap  37.13%  37.11% 37.15% 36.08% 36.05% 36.11% 30.38% 30.35% 30.41% 29.48% 29.44% 29.51% 24.35% 24.32% 24.39%
Poverty severity  25.67%  25.65% 25.70% 24.76% 24.73% 24.79% 19.95% 19.92% 19.99% 19.25% 19.22% 19.28% 15.28% 15.25% 15.30%
External poverty incidence  40.90%  40.85% 40.94% 39.71% 39.65% 39.76% 32.62% 32.55% 32.68% 31.50% 31.43% 31.58% 25.46% 25.39% 25.52%
External poverty gap  20.83%  20.80% 20.85% 19.95% 19.92% 19.98% 15.41% 15.37% 15.45% 14.78% 14.75% 14.82% 11.29% 11.26% 11.32%
External poverty severity  13.79%  13.77% 13.82% 13.12% 13.09% 13.15% 9.75% 9.71% 9.78% 9.31% 9.28% 9.34% 6.85% 6.83% 6.88%
Theil - per capita household income  1.019  1.018 1.019 1.009 1.009 1.010 0.940 0.940 0.941 0.934 0.933 0.934 1.016 1.015 1.016
Gini - per capita household income  0.648  0.648 0.648 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.628 0.628 0.628
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Table 13. Continued 
  Baseline-2020 TARCUT1-2020 Maquila-2020  ALLCAFTA-2020  FDI--2020 











Rural                   
Labor income  1957.3  1954.7 1959.8 1973.8 1971.1 1976.5 2061.5 2058.7 2064.4 2072.4 2069.4 2075.4 2129.4 2125.8 2132.9
Theil - labor income  0.994  0.992 0.996 0.986 0.984 0.988 0.943 0.941 0.945 0.937 0.934 0.939 0.911 0.909 0.913
Gini - labor income  0.642  0.642 0.642 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.635 0.634 0.635 0.634 0.633 0.634 0.629 0.629 0.630
Per capita household income  980.5  979.5 981.6 1008.5 1007.4 1009.6 1170.1 1168.7 1171.5 1200.3 1198.7 1201.9 1467.8 1466.1 1469.6
Poverty incidence  75.88%  75.81% 75.96% 74.85% 74.80% 74.91% 68.06% 67.95% 68.16% 66.80% 66.68% 66.91% 59.20% 59.08% 59.33%
Poverty gap  46.01%  45.96% 46.06% 44.79% 44.74% 44.84% 37.85% 37.79% 37.92% 36.76% 36.69% 36.83% 30.65% 30.59% 30.70%
Poverty severity  33.15%  33.10% 33.20% 32.05% 32.00% 32.09% 25.93% 25.87% 26.00% 25.03% 24.97% 25.10% 20.03% 19.98% 20.08%
External poverty incidence  54.24%  54.16% 54.31% 52.87% 52.78% 52.96% 44.08% 43.98% 44.18% 42.70% 42.57% 42.83% 35.12% 35.01% 35.24%
External poverty gap  29.20%  29.14% 29.25% 28.06% 28.01% 28.12% 21.93% 21.86% 22.01% 21.07% 21.00% 21.14% 16.27% 16.21% 16.33%
External poverty severity  19.62%  19.57% 19.67% 18.73% 18.68% 18.78% 14.09% 14.02% 14.15% 13.46% 13.40% 13.51% 10.01% 9.96% 10.05%
Theil - per capita household income  0.949  0.948 0.951 0.934 0.932 0.935 0.833 0.831 0.834 0.820 0.819 0.822 0.889 0.888 0.890
Gini - per capita household income  0.622  0.622 0.622 0.618 0.617 0.618 0.589 0.589 0.590 0.586 0.585 0.586 0.587 0.586 0.587
        
Urban      
Labor income  4923.6  4921.1 4926.1 4915.6 4912.8 4918.4 4790.7 4787.8 4793.7 4791.5 4788.4 4794.6 4687.5 4684.0 4691.0
Theil - labor income  0.788  0.787 0.789 0.794 0.793 0.794 0.817 0.816 0.818 0.821 0.820 0.822 0.836 0.835 0.837
Gini - labor income  0.593  0.592 0.593 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.603 0.603 0.604 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.610 0.609 0.610
Per capita household income  2747.5  2746.4 2748.5 2816.2 2815.0 2817.3 3128.0 3126.4 3129.5 3199.1 3197.3 3200.8 3819.1 3817.3 3821.0
Poverty incidence  56.16%  56.11% 56.22% 55.10% 55.03% 55.16% 49.47% 49.39% 49.55% 48.53% 48.46% 48.61% 41.86% 41.76% 41.95%
Poverty gap  27.59%  27.56% 27.62% 26.72% 26.69% 26.75% 22.35% 22.30% 22.39% 21.66% 21.61% 21.70% 17.60% 17.55% 17.64%
Poverty severity  17.64%  17.61% 17.66% 16.93% 16.91% 16.96% 13.53% 13.49% 13.57% 13.03% 12.99% 13.07% 10.17% 10.14% 10.20%
External poverty incidence  26.57%  26.51% 26.63% 25.57% 25.51% 25.64% 20.30% 20.23% 20.38% 19.48% 19.39% 19.56% 15.08% 14.99% 15.16%
External poverty gap  11.84%  11.81% 11.87% 11.23% 11.20% 11.26% 8.41% 8.36% 8.45% 8.03% 7.99% 8.07% 5.94% 5.90% 5.97%
External poverty severity  7.54%  7.51% 7.56% 7.09% 7.06% 7.11% 5.09% 5.05% 5.12% 4.85% 4.82% 4.88% 3.47% 3.44% 3.49%
Theil - per capita household income  0.878  0.877 0.879 0.872 0.871 0.872 0.828 0.828 0.829 0.825 0.824 0.826 0.921 0.920 0.921
Gini - per capita household income  0.599  0.598 0.599 0.597 0.597 0.597 0.584 0.583 0.584 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.594 0.594 0.594
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
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This result may seem surprising, particularly since protection in agriculture is reduced under 
CAFTA. The poor gain because the growth rates of both employment and income are projected to be 
higher under CAFTA than without it. And while it is true that protection for agriculture falls under 
CAFTA, there are two points to keep in mind. First, protection of sensitive products like corn, beans, and 
rice is reduced very slowly. Second, the reductions in tariffs permit expansions elsewhere that more than 
offset whatever negative effects CAFTA may have in particular subsectors.  
Not only does the tariff reduction under CAFTA help the poor, it also slightly improves the 
distribution of income. Compare the Theil coefficients in 2020 in the baseline and tariff-cut scenarios. 
The Gini coefficient appears to be unchanged, but the Theil, which gives more weight to the bottom of the 
distribution, goes down by two points in the rural sector and one in the urban. Both changes are 
statistically significant. This is an important and somewhat surprising result. Recall that in the tariff-cut 
scenario the rate of growth of skilled employment increases slightly over the baseline and so does the 
relative wage of the skilled. Those changes are small, which is why the distribution of labor income is the 
same in both the baseline and tariff cut scenarios. At the household level, adding the wages of formerly 
unemployed, unskilled workers to the ranks of the employed makes a sufficient difference at the bottom 
of the income pyramid to more than offset the absolute gains in employment and wages for the skilled.  
The continuation of special market-access conditions for the maquila industry under CAFTA is 
even more favorable for the poor than the tariff reductions under CAFTA. Compare the MAQUILA 
column for 2020 in Table 12 with either the BASELINE or TARCUT columns. At the national level, 
poverty falls by a remarkable 7 percentage points relative to the baseline and 6 percentage points relative 
to tariff cuts. Even though the maquila industry is mainly an urban activity, poverty actually declines 
further in the rural sector than it does in the urban. This is because the additional employment and income 
generated in this sector increases the demand for agricultural commodities produced by the poor just as 
much as it does for items produced in the cities.  
The effects on the distribution of household income in the maquila scenario illustrate the 
progressive impact of this industry on the Honduran economy. The distribution of labor income does not 
change much because rising skill differentials for the skilled in the urban sector just about offset gains by 
the unskilled in the rural sector. But when we look at the change in distribution of family income, the 
picture is entirely different. There the additional income generated by job growth, particularly for the 
unskilled, drives the national Gini down from 0.65 to 0.62 and the Theil, from 1.02 to 0.94, and both 
changes are statistically significant. And as a closer look at the urban and rural distribution data shows, 
the favorable impact of maquila is actually greater in the rural sector than in the urban.  
The reason for these favorable results is job creation, particularly for unskilled women. 
Employment growth overall in the maquila simulation rises from 2.7 percent in the baseline to 3.7  
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percent. For unskilled women, the growth rate rises from 2.8 to 4.0 percent. This is the rare case of a 
growth and employment trajectory led by unskilled labor. It underlines the general point that the most 
effective way to reduce poverty is through job creation. If the leading sectors are themselves big 
employers of the unskilled, as maquila is, the result is all the more favorable for the poor.  
There is, however, a problem of perception with respect to maquila. CAFTA does not actually 
change current conditions for the domestic textile industry. Rather it makes permanent the liberalized 
rules of origin enjoyed by the industry since 2000. In the popular mind that may not seem like much of a 
benefit, since the country already has it. But without CAFTA, the temporary benefits granted in 2000 will 
expire. Our results say that if that happened, growth would fall by 1.4 percent per year and employment 
for unskilled and semi-skilled labor would fall by 26 percent relative to what can be expected with 
CAFTA.
20  Although these are large effects, one must keep in mind that they do not take into account 
possible changes in external conditions due to the end of the Multifiber Agreement in 2005.  
The next scenario, ALLCAFTA, applies both the CAFTA tariff cuts and maquila market access 
conditions at the same time. The results are approximately equal to the sum of the two scenarios 
considered separately. Tariff cuts alone reduce poverty by about 1 percentage point relative to the 
baseline. Adding those same tariff cuts to maquila reduces poverty by about 1 percentage point relative to 
what was achieved under maquila alone. We see the same favorable effect on the distribution statistics for 
household income; the national Theil falls by one point relative to maquila just as it did relative to the 
baseline in the TARCUT1 scenario.  
The ALLCAFTA simulation is our best estimate of the effects that CAFTA is likely to have on 
poverty and the distribution of income.
21 If we compare the results of ALLCAFTA with those of 
MAQUILA, it is obvious that maquila is the part of the agreement that really makes a difference. Tariff 
cuts help. They are progressive and increase the rate of growth of employment slightly. Maquila is 
another story entirely. It generates a lot of employment, significantly reduces both moderate and extreme 
poverty levels in both the rural and urban sectors, and increases the overall growth rate of the economy. 
Of the total change in poverty in the ALLCAFTA simulation (8.4 percentage points) fully 87 percent 
comes from the maquila component, and only 13 percent from tariff cuts. Much attention has been 
focused on the effects of CAFTA tariff cuts on agriculture. Our results indicate that this focus misses the 
main favorable impact of the agreement—making permanent the favorable market access conditions of 
the CBTPA.  
                                                      
20/ This percentage is the difference between total employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled male and female labor in 
2020 in the maquila experiment, compared with the baseline in 2020.  
21/ The FDI simulation, which we will examine next, is far more speculative, since it incorporates uncertain reactions of 
foreign investors to changes in the treatment of intellectual property rights and legal protections for foreign investment.   
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The FDI simulation, which we look at next, underlines the key point we have just made about the 
central role of employment creation in poverty reduction. Recall that in the FDI simulation, we ask what 
would happen if the CAFTA treatment of foreign direct investment did in fact result in an increased 
inflow of foreign funds linked to productive investments in the private sector. We repeat our earlier point 
that this simulation is purely speculative. We have no way of knowing whether foreign firms will react 
favorably to CAFTA. Instead we are interested in examining what the implications would be if they did 
respond favorably.  
To do that, we assume that FDI increased by 25 percent over the level of observed capital 
transfers to Honduras between 2000 and 2004. But the really important part of this simulation is the 
assumption that all this additional foreign exchange is channeled into productive investment. The results 
of this increase in capital formation are dramatic. In Table 12, we see that per capita income in 2020 in 
the FDI run is fully 41 percent higher than the base run, and even 20 percent higher than in the 
ALLCAFTA simulation.  Growth rises to 5.3 percent, compared to 3.1 percent in the base run. All that 
additional growth and output mean more employment as well. With higher capital formation comes more 
employment, with the total number of jobs expanding at 5.8 percent per year, more than double the 
growth rate in the base run.  
The results for poverty are as dramatic as those on employment and production. By 2020 the 
national poverty rate falls by 7 percentage points relative to the ALLCAFTA scenario and almost 16 
points compared with the baseline. Because, by assumption, this additional capital is available to all 
sectors, rural and urban, FDI benefits both sectors and the extremely poor as well. This complements the 
earlier point that employment creation is a central element in sustainable poverty reduction. This 
simulation makes the point that the surest way to rapidly increase employment is through higher rates of 
capital formation. Indeed, the rate of job creation in this simulation is so high that whether it is feasible is 
unclear.  
While increased FDI has a large positive impact on poverty, it also increases inequality, partly as 
a result of a rise in inequality in the urban sector more than offsetting a rise in equality in the rural sector. 
Overall, the Theil indicates that the distribution of labor income is almost constant, compared with the 
baseline scenario, while it actually improves slightly using the Gini. In the rural sector, the distribution of 
labor income is significantly more equitable in the FDI simulation than in the baseline, but just the 
opposite is true in the urban sector. These differences are accentuated by the profit component. The 
declining profit rate in the FDI simulation is more than offset by the very large increase in the total supply 
of capital and in the incomes of the holders of capital in the survey. This is particularly obvious if one 
compares the distributions of household income in the ALLCAFTA and FDI simulations. In the 
ALLCAFTA simulation, all the distribution statistics show equality increasing, reflecting higher  
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employment growth led by the unskilled. In the FDI simulation, the rate of employment growth is even 
higher and is led by the unskilled. But in the Theil, there is a big increase in inequality in the household 
distribution, particularly at the national level, even though the distribution of wage income in the rural 
sector is actually more equal in the FDI than in the ALLCAFTA. That has to reflect the influence of 
returns to capital.  
Decomposing the Changes in Poverty and Distribution 
The changes in poverty and distribution in Table 12 for the different scenarios are the result of changes in 
employment, in the skill composition of the employed labor force, and in relative wages. We can use the 
microsimulation methodology to get an idea of how important each of these changes is to the final 
observations in the table.   
The microsimulation procedure used to derive the results in Table 12 is a way of estimating the 
poverty and distributional impact of the changes in the labor market, determined by a CGE equilibrium 
solution and including changes in unemployment, labor force structure, or skill composition and relative 
wages. Since these changes are made sequentially in the microsimulation, we can make a “quasi-
decomposition” of the overall change in poverty or distribution, according to statistics calculated 
separately at each stage of the microsimulation. In other words, we can ask what the poverty or 
distribution level would be if the overall employment growth had stayed as it was in the CGE solution but 
with labor force structure and relative wages held constant. We can repeat this procedure at each step of 
the microsimulation and calculate the change in poverty and distribution resulting from the particular 
change in the labor market solution (see Table 14).We call this a “quasi-decomposition” because one 
cannot build up to the final CGE solution in this way. The CGE is not asked to determine the rate of 
growth of total employment, holding the labor force structure constant. If it were, the overall rate of 
growth of employment would almost certainly have been lower than the one determined by the CGE. We 
can ask what the effect on poverty is of a change in total employment, holding the labor force structure 
constant, but that is not a CGE solution, nor is it a part of the CGE solution. Indeed the whole point of the 
CGE is that overall growth will almost certainly involve changes in labor force structure and relative 
wages. Having said this, it is still instructive to undertake this quasi-decomposition to get an idea of 
which of the various changes in the labor market seems to have had the biggest impact on poverty and the 
distribution.  
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Table 14. Decomposition of CAFTA affects in 2020 
     Baseline  TARCUT1  Maquila  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
    2004 E  S  W E S W E S W E S W E S W 
National                                                 
Labor income  3349.1  3358.9 3376.2 3469.5 3357.2 3378.8 3477.4 3341.1 3344.2 3463.9 3341.4 3345.6 3470.4 3315.6 3291.1 3449.3 
Theil - labor income  0.93  0.93 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.95 
Gini - labor income  0.63  0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.64 
Per capita household income  1643.7  1751.5 1756.2 1833.3 1783.0 1790.6 1880.9 1971.8 1972.6 2115.0 2006.8 2007.6 2165.0 2142.9 2129.4 2602.6 
Poverty incidence  70.07%  66.95% 67.01% 66.38% 66.02% 66.05% 65.33% 60.08% 60.13% 59.10% 58.93% 59.07% 57.99% 54.44% 54.48% 50.84% 
Poverty gap  40.68%  37.45% 37.55% 37.13% 36.49% 36.59% 36.08% 31.03% 31.08% 30.38% 30.12% 30.24% 29.48% 26.46% 26.45% 24.35% 
Poverty severity  28.77%  25.91% 26.01% 25.67% 25.04% 25.16% 24.76% 20.43% 20.48% 19.95% 19.71% 19.81% 19.25% 16.80% 16.77% 15.28% 
External poverty incidence  45.27%  41.31% 41.43% 40.90% 40.15% 40.29% 39.71% 33.43% 33.49% 32.62% 32.29% 32.46% 31.50% 27.88% 27.85% 25.46% 
External poverty gap  23.81%  21.02% 21.13% 20.83% 20.17% 20.30% 19.95% 15.82% 15.87% 15.41% 15.17% 15.27% 14.78% 12.55% 12.51% 11.29% 
External poverty severity  16.08%  13.93% 14.01% 13.79% 13.25% 13.37% 13.12% 10.02% 10.06% 9.75% 9.56% 9.64% 9.31% 7.70% 7.66% 6.85% 
Theil - per capita household income  1.03  0.98 0.98 1.02 0.96 0.96 1.01 0.87 0.87 0.94 0.86 0.86 0.93 0.80 0.79 1.02 
Gini - per capita household income  0.65  0.64 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.63 
         
Rural        
Labor income  1879.3  1945.0 1942.9 1957.3 1957.9 1958.7 1973.8 2045.6 2043.3 2061.5 2054.7 2053.6 2072.4 2107.8 2105.4 2129.4 
Theil - labor income  1.01  0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.91 
Gini - labor income  0.64  0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Per capita household income  879.6  955.6 953.2 980.5 975.8 975.3 1008.5 1115.4 1115.2 1170.1 1137.1 1138.9 1200.3 1247.5 1246.1 1467.8 
Poverty incidence  79.54%  76.14% 76.29% 75.88% 75.22% 75.31% 74.85% 68.81% 68.78% 68.06% 67.61% 67.58% 66.80% 62.45% 62.51% 59.20% 
Poverty gap  50.20%  46.24% 46.41% 46.01% 45.21% 45.28% 44.79% 38.58% 38.56% 37.85% 37.53% 37.53% 36.76% 32.89% 32.92% 30.65% 
Poverty severity  37.02%  33.36% 33.52% 33.15% 32.39% 32.48% 32.05% 26.55% 26.53% 25.93% 25.67% 25.68% 25.03% 21.82% 21.83% 20.03% 
External poverty incidence  59.54%  54.67% 54.82% 54.24% 53.46% 53.49% 52.87% 45.10% 45.07% 44.08% 43.74% 43.82% 42.70% 37.95% 38.06% 35.12% 
External poverty gap  33.17%  29.40% 29.56% 29.20% 28.40% 28.50% 28.06% 22.54% 22.52% 21.93% 21.69% 21.70% 21.07% 17.97% 17.97% 16.27% 
External poverty severity  22.74%  19.77% 19.91% 19.62% 18.96% 19.08% 18.73% 14.54% 14.52% 14.09% 13.91% 13.92% 13.46% 11.21% 11.18% 10.01% 
Theil - per capita household income  0.99  0.91 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.69 0.69 0.89 
Gini - per capita household income  0.63  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.59 
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Table 14. Continued   
     Baseline  TARCUT1  Maquila  ALLCAFTA  FDI 
    2004  E S  W E  S W E S W E S W E S W 
Urban                      
Labor income  4779.9  4720.3 4754.5 4923.6 4696.5 4737.1 4915.6 4564.0 4575.0 4790.7 4549.8 4566.7 4791.5 4448.0 4403.5 4687.5 
Theil - labor income  0.74  0.75 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.84 
Gini - labor income  0.58  0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.61 
Per capita household income  2462.7  2604.6 2616.9 2747.5 2648.3 2664.5 2816.2 2889.8 2891.6 3128.0 2939.0 2938.9 3199.1 3102.7 3076.3 3819.1 
Poverty incidence  59.90%  57.07% 57.04% 56.16% 56.14% 56.10% 55.10% 50.70% 50.84% 49.47% 49.60% 49.93% 48.53% 45.85% 45.86% 41.86% 
Poverty gap  30.45%  28.00% 28.04% 27.59% 27.13% 27.25% 26.72% 22.92% 23.05% 22.35% 22.17% 22.41% 21.66% 19.55% 19.49% 17.60% 
Poverty severity  19.91%  17.90% 17.94% 17.64% 17.15% 17.29% 16.93% 13.86% 13.98% 13.53% 13.31% 13.51% 13.03% 11.41% 11.33% 10.17% 
External poverty incidence  29.94%  26.96% 27.05% 26.57% 25.87% 26.10% 25.57% 20.89% 21.06% 20.30% 19.99% 20.26% 19.48% 17.07% 16.89% 15.08% 
External poverty gap  13.76%  12.02% 12.07% 11.84% 11.34% 11.49% 11.23% 8.60% 8.72% 8.41% 8.18% 8.36% 8.03% 6.73% 6.64% 5.94% 
External poverty severity  8.93%  7.65% 7.67% 7.54% 7.11% 7.24% 7.09% 5.16% 5.26% 5.09% 4.89% 5.04% 4.85% 3.94% 3.88% 3.47% 
Theil - per capita household income  0.88  0.84 0.84 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.71 0.71 0.92 
Gini - per capita household income  0.60  0.59 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.59 
Source: Authors’ worksheets 
Notes: E is employment, S is skills, and W is wages. 
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There are three columns for each of the scenarios for the year 2020 in Table 14. The first, labeled 
E, gives the results from employment growth alone, holding both the skill composition (S) and relative 
wages (W) at their 2005 levels. It applies the rate of growth of total employment in each scenario to each 
category of labor. For example, in the baseline scenario, total employment grows at 2.7 percent per year 
between 2005 and 2020. That rate is applied to all the categories of labor used in the model. The 
microsimulation brings enough workers out of unemployment or inactivity to reach that rate and then 
assigns them the average wage observed in the base year for that particular type of labor.    
The second column, labeled S, changes the skill composition of the employed labor force so that 
in 2020 the rate of growth by skill category and gender of the labor force is consistent with the CGE 
model solution for 2020. In this case, the microsimulation brings enough workers out of unemployment or 
inactivity to reach the rate of growth of employment for each skill class generated by the CGE model for 
2020. It assigns to each new worker the average wage by skill observed in the base year. Finally, in the 
column labeled W, we show the effect of changing relative wages by giving each of the workers in the S 
or skill-level solution the wage shown in the CGE solution for 2020, rather than the one from the base 
year. The W columns for each scenario are identical to the columns for 2020 in Table 12.  
There are three main points to be gleaned from Table 14. First, the growth in total employment is 
far and away the most important driver of poverty reduction in all of the scenarios. Second, employment 
in each of the growth strategies, even maquila, is led by skilled labor. Third, despite the rise in the wage 
differential in favor of the better educated, poverty incidence is lower when we incorporate the higher 
differential into household income. We now discuss the evidence supporting these conclusions and the 
implications. 
Consider the employment effect first. To see how big a component of the total change in poverty 
it is, compare the change in poverty between 2004 and the column labeled E with the total change 
between 2004 and column W for each scenario. For example, in the tariff-cut scenario, national poverty 
falls from 70.1 percent in 2004 to 66.0 percent in 2020 just from employment creation, holding skill 
structure and relative wages constant. When we allow both of those other factors to vary in column W, 
poverty falls an additional 0.7 percentage points to 65.3 percent. In other words, out of the total change of 
4.74 percentage points in poverty, induced by CAFTA, 85 percent comes from employment growth alone. 
The same pattern is repeated in each of the other scenarios. The faster the economy grows, the more 
employment it creates and the more poverty reduction there is, even if that growth is skill-intensive as is 
the case in the FDI scenario.  
All the growth strategies, including the baseline, generate a higher demand for skilled labor than 
for unskilled. That is why in each scenario the incidence of poverty in the S column is higher than in E. 
Recall that by definition in the sequential microsimulation exercise, the E column tells us what the  
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poverty incidence would be if the structure of employment was unchanged from the base, and 
employment in each skill class grew at the average rate of growth of total employment generated by the 
CGE model. In the S column simulation, we permit employment for different skill classes to grow at the 
rate determined by the CGE. At the national level in every case, growth of the skilled labor force was 
higher than the average rate of growth of total employment, which means that employment for the 
unskilled underlying column S is lower than in the E column. This is what makes the poverty rates 
slightly higher in S than in E. What is also interesting is that the degree of skill intensity appears to be 
slightly lower in the tariff-cut scenario than in the base run. In the latter, increasing skill intensity drives 
up poverty by 0.06 percent between E and S, whereas in the TARCUT1 microsimulation, the increase in 
poverty is only 0.03 percent. That says that growth under CAFTA-induced trade liberalization is less skill 
intensive than it would have been in the absence of CAFTA. There are some rather curious divergences 
between the rural and urban sectors. In the base run, the incidence of rural poverty rises quite a bit in 
response to more skill-intensive growth. In each of the other simulations, it rises a bit less and in fact falls 
in both the MAQUILA and the ALLCAFTA simulations, which implies that CAFTA increases the rate of 
growth of unskilled labor in the rural sector relative to what it would have been otherwise. The opposite is 
true in the urban sector. In both the base run and TARCUT1, poverty is lower with the simulated change 
in skill intensity, and that is only reversed when we require much higher overall growth rates of 
employment in the MAQUILA, ALLCAFTA, and FDI simulations.  
The third result to be taken from Table 14 is that increasing the skill differential, which we do in 
each of the W columns, reduces the incidence of poverty. Furthermore, when the FDI columns are 
compared with any of the others, we see that the faster the rise in the wage differential and the more 
employment created for the skilled, the bigger the reduction in poverty. This is a surprising result. Recall 
that in the model real wages for the unskilled are constant, whereas employment and wages are 
endogenously determined for skilled labor. The faster the rate of growth in the demand for the skilled, the 
bigger the wage differential will be. The difference between columns E and S is the isolated effect of the 
wage changes coming from the CGE, since employment growth by skill is the same in both columns. This 
means that there must have been many poor households with educated members who were either 
unemployed or out of the labor force in the base year 2004. Putting them to work, even at the base-period 
wage, is one of the reasons that the poverty rate falls from 2004 to the E column of each of the 
simulations. When we add on the rise in the relative wage as well, we reduce poverty even more. In the 
base run, for example, at the national level, the additional employment of skilled and unskilled labor 
(column S) reduces the poverty rate from 70.1 to 67.0 percent. Since we are assuming a constant real 
wage for the unskilled, the only change between columns S and W is that in W we increase the relative 
wage of the skilled by 12 percent relative to its base level, and that reduces poverty from 67.0 to 66.4  
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percent. The same result is repeated in each of the other simulations, and for both the rural and the urban 
sectors. Rising skill intensity and rising skill differentials obviously help richer households. The 
distribution of labor income becomes less equal.  But our results say that they help the poor as well.  
.                                                                                                                  
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8.  CONCLUSIONS 
In order to calculate the effects of CAFTA, we built a dynamic CGE model with which to compare the 
trajectory of employment and output with and without CAFTA. This comparison shows that the impact of 
trade liberalization under CAFTA will be small but positive. Even with constant rates of capital 
formation, it unambiguously increases the amount of employment for the unskilled and helps the poor in 
both the rural and urban sectors. At the same time, in all the alternative CAFTA scenarios, relative wages 
for the skilled rise, while poverty declines. And in spite of the rise in the wage differential, the 
distribution of household income actually improves slightly because so many of the new workers in the 
CAFTA scenarios come from poor families.  
Critics of CAFTA complain that smallholders will be hurt by the removel of tariff protection for 
sensitive products such as corn, rice, beans, and pork, which are produced and consumed by the poor. Our 
results do not support this view. Both agriculture in general and subsistence agriculture in particular grow 
faster under CAFTA than could be expected otherwise. The increases in the growth rate are not large, but 
they are positive. That is partly because tariffs for many sensitive products will be reduced very slowly or 
not at all, and partly because the rise of employment in other sectors more than compensates for any loss 
of employment in the sensitive sectors themselves.  
In spite of the importance of agriculture in the Honduran economy, it appears that the CAFTA 
provisions regarding the maquila sector are actually more significant for poverty, employment, and 
growth. Making permanent the liberalized rules of origin of the CBTPA Treaty increases the annual rate 
of growth of GDP by 1.3 percent and employment growth by 1.4 percent,  relative to what they would 
have been had CAFTA not been approved. That has a dramatic impact on poverty and the distribution of 
household income because so many of the new workers are unskilled women from poor families. We 
estimate that by 2020, maquila will lower the poverty rate by 6 percentage points and the Gini coefficient 
by 3 percentage points relative to the tax cut scenario. All of these results underline the critical 
importance of job creation in increasing the growth rate of the economy and lowering its poverty rate. 
However, because the maquila benefits under CAFTA are not a change from current treatment but rather 
a conversion from a temporary to a permanent benefit, approving CAFTA will not raise the growth rate of 
the economy by 1.3 percent, relative to its current growth trajectory. Rather, without CAFTA, we project 
that the economy will grow 1.3 percent less than it would if the maquila benefits of the CBTPA are made 
permanent.  
The key to growth and poverty reduction in Honduras lies in finding a way to create more jobs, 
particularly for the unskilled. Maquila is one way to do this. It changes skill intensity in the economy 
progressively without increasing overall capital requirements. But CAFTA needs to be complemented by  
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policies that stimulate more capital formation as well. Higher rates of capital formation as demonstrated 
in the FDI scenario have a large and positive impact on growth, employment, and poverty. Unfortunately, 
there is no assurance that the effects of CAFTA on foreign investment will actually lead to the higher 
rates of investment that we used in our simulation. CAFTA is not a magic bullet. By itself it will not solve 
Honduras’s problems of poverty and slow growth. For that, complementary policies that make agriculture 
more productive and stimulate higher rates of capital formation are needed.   
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APPENDIX A:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE  
Table A.1. Growth rates of trade by sector 
   INITIAL  SHARE BASE  CAFTA  MAQUILA QUOTAS ALLCAFTA  FDI 
   1997 (Annual  percentage growth rate 1997-2020) 
EXPORTS              
BAN-C  7.71 1.01  1.49  1.38  1.01  1.80  4.39 
COF-C  7.08 2.01  2.33  2.68  2.01  2.95  6.66 
MIN-C  2.65 2.08  2.54  2.55  2.08  2.91  5.88 
LIV-C  0.40 2.92  3.12  4.93  2.92  5.08  6.27 
NTA-C  11.28 2.45  2.58  3.21  2.45  3.32  5.93 
SUB-C  0.06 3.02  3.17  4.57  3.02  4.69  6.19 
ALI-C  25.74 2.88  3.09  4.27  2.88  4.45  6.4 
TEX-C  5.26 2.19  2.34  3.31  2.19  3.43  5.93 
PAP-C  2.64 2.30  2.48  2.95  2.30  3.09  5.93 
CHE-C  1.20 2.25  2.45  3.11  2.25  3.27  5.01 
MET-C  0.44 2.70  2.91  3.50  2.70  3.68  6.03 
OMA-C  12.57 2.23  2.71  3.00  2.24  3.41  5.72 
EWG-C  0.06 2.67  2.83  3.40  2.67  3.53  6.02 
HOT-C  8.09 2.50  2.68  4.60  2.50  4.71  5.82 
TPT-C  4.82 2.69  2.95  3.29  2.69  3.51  6.5 
FIN-C  1.00 2.43  2.52  3.00  2.44  3.07  5.63 
GOV-C  5.33 2.60  2.70  3.11  2.60  3.19  6.05 
OTH-C  3.67 2.74  2.84  3.47  2.74  3.55  6.22 
TOTAL  100.00 2.42  2.67  3.46  2.43 3.66  6.01 
IMPORTS              
BAN-C  0.03 3.37  3.62  4.37  3.37  4.62  6.06 
COF-C  0.00 3.94  4.21  5.14  3.94  5.42  8.13 
MIN-C  10.62 2.94  3.16  3.91  2.94  4.11  6.42 
LIV-C  4.73 3.42  3.68  4.51  3.43  4.75  6.49 
NTA-C  4.82 3.36  3.63  4.80  3.36  5.06  6.5 
SUB-C  0.01 3.55  3.71  4.66  3.56  4.81  6.5 
ALI-C  0.00 3.57  3.64  4.64  3.58  4.71  6.72 
TEX-C  6.46 3.39  3.65  -24.56  3.40  -24.37  6.46 
PAP-C  3.54 2.87  3.12  3.92  2.88  4.13  6.21 
CHE-C  7.58 3.04  3.30  4.08  3.05  4.30  5.85 
MET-C  6.35 3.26  3.48  4.37  3.27  4.56  6.42 
OMA-C  15.51 3.32  3.48  4.32  3.32  4.47  6.66 
EWG-C  0.15 3.17  3.52  4.73  3.17  5.05  6.17 
CON-C  0.08 3.76  3.99  4.92  3.76  5.14  6.86 
HOT-C  2.27 3.41  3.51  4.47  3.42  4.56  6.23 
TPT-C  11.95 3.34  3.46  4.47  3.34  4.58  6.85 
FIN-C  2.00 3.38  3.56  4.65  3.39  4.80  6.47 
PER-C  1.65 3.37  3.49  4.42  3.38  4.52  6.53 
GOV-C  0.25 3.65  3.76  4.75  3.65  4.85  6.81 
OTH-C  21.98 3.38  3.50  4.49  3.39  4.60  6.47 
TOTAL  100.00 3.27  3.46  4.06  3.28 4.21  6.48 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Note: For a description of the sectors, see Table B.1 in Appendix B.  
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APPENDIX B:  DOCUMENTATION OF THE SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX, 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY FOR HONDURAS, AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF 
THE RECURSIVE DYNAMIC CGE 
The Social Accounting Matrix for 1997 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used in this study is based on the 1997 SAM developed by Jose 
Cuesta and described in Cuesta (2005). First, this SAM distinguishes between accounts for “activities” 
(the entities that carry out production) and “commodities” (markets for goods and services). The receipts 
are valued at producer prices in the activity accounts and at market prices in the commodity accounts 
(including indirect commodity taxes and transaction costs). Activity outputs are either exported or sold 
domestically, while commodities comprise domestic supply and imports. This separation of activities 
from commodities is preferred because it permits activities to produce multiple commodities (for 
example, a dairy activity may produce both cheese and milk, which are delivered to different commodity 
markets). And any commodity may be produced by multiple activities (for example, the same maize 
commodity may be produced by both small- and large-scale production activities.  
Second, the matrix explicitly associates trade flows with transactions (trade and transportation) 
costs, also referred to as marketing margins. For each commodity, the SAM accounts for the transaction 
costs associated with domestic, import, and export marketing. For domestic marketing of domestic output, 
the marketing margin represents the cost of moving the commodity from the producer to the domestic 
market. For imports, it represents the cost of moving the commodity from the border (adding to the c.i.f. 
price) to the domestic market. For exports, it shows the cost of moving the commodity from the producer 
to the border (reducing the price received by producers relative to the f.o.b. price).  
Third, the government is disaggregated into a core government account and various tax collection 
accounts, one for each tax type. This disaggregation is often necessary because the economic 
interpretation of some payments may otherwise be ambiguous. In any given application, the SAM may 
exclude any (or all) of these specific tax collection accounts. In the SAM, payments between the 
government and other domestic institutions represent government transfers. 
Fourth, the domestic nongovernment institutions in the SAM consist of households and 
enterprises. The enterprises earn factor incomes (reflecting their ownership of capital or land or both) and 
may also receive transfers from other institutions. Enterprises pay corporate (direct) taxes, save, and 
transfer profits to other institutions. Assuming that the relevant data are available, it is preferable to have 
one or more accounts for enterprises when these have tax obligations and savings behavior that are 
independent of and different from the household sector. Enterprises should be disaggregated in a manner 
that captures differences across various enterprise types in terms of tax rates, savings rates, and the shares 
of retained earnings that are received by different household types.  
  49
Finally, the SAM distinguishes between own home consumption, which is activity based, and 
marketed consumption, which is commodity based. Home consumption, which in the SAM appears as 
household payments to activities, is valued at producer prices. Household consumption of marketed 
commodities appears as payments from household accounts to commodity accounts, the values of which 
include marketing margins and commodity taxes. 
The 1997 macro SAM for Honduras uses as data sources the national accounts prepared by the 
Central Bank; information on capital flows from the Ministry of Finance; data on labor behavior and on 
income and expenditure from the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) and Incomes and Expenditures 
National Household Survey (ENIGH) household surveys, respectively. Final household consumption, 
private investment, public investment, government recurrent and investment expenditures, value added, 
remittances, net capital inflows, interest payments, and other factor payments abroad all come from the 
national accounts and balance of payments. Exports (at f.o.b.), imports (at c.i.f.), government savings, and 
all categories of taxes come from the Honduras Ministry of Finance statistical sourcebook The proportion 
of self-consumption in total household consumption is estimated at 12.6 percent from the ENIGH 1997 
household survey. The distribution of value added between households and firms results from initially 
pro-rating total value added with a 60–40 percent thumb rule for labor and capital, respectively. 
Government transfers to firms include net public transfers to public enterprises providing electricity, 
water, sanitation, telephone, and forestry-related services.   
Government transfers to households include subsidy schemes to public transportation, residential 
electricity consumption, family allowances, schooling grants and scholarships, among others. Transaction 
costs are estimated, assuming a 15 percent share of the gross domestic supply, exports, and imports, 
respectively. This estimated share is in line with estimated margin costs for the transportation of food, 
agricultural products, and manufactures reported by Gehlhar (1998) as part of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP)
22 worldwide project. The net domestic supply entry is estimated as the difference 
between gross domestic output, exports, households’ self-consumption, and transaction costs. The 
government investment deficit is the residual that balances out the total government recurrent column, 
while intermediate demand is the entry that allows the gross output total to balance out. Categories of 
taxes are aggregated into two indirect taxes (one on production, the other on sales), tariffs, export taxes, 
export subsidies, and direct income taxes.  
Activities and commodities are disaggregated in 24 categories (Table B.1). Each activity is the 
only producer of its respective commodity. Agriculture is disaggregated into subsistence products (mainly 
grains), traditional, and nontraditional exports. Traditional agriculture exports further separate bananas, 
                                                      
22 / The University of Purdue’s Center for Global Trade Analysis conducts the Global Trade Analysis Project, which 
provides among other things information on the composition of domestic production and trade for a large set of commodities and 
countries in the world.   
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coffee, and sugar, which in addition to nonagricultural traditional exports (such as forestry, livestock, and 
mining) constitute the most relevant traditional exports in Honduras. As for manufactures, textiles—
mainly in the form of maquila production—can be singled out from paper, chemical, and other 
manufactures. Given its importance to consumption, and ultimately, to poverty, the category of food, 
beverages, and tobacco manufactures is also accounted for separately from other manufactures.  
Public and private services are initially separated as well. Government services aggregate 
defense, administration, and social security into a single category. Private services are disaggregated into 
hospitality, transportation, financial, personal, social, and community services, and other services. 
Interestingly, other services refer mainly to housing services, thus distinguishing them from financial 
services. This is a practice followed by the national accounts, which avoids a misleading perception that a 
joint financial and housing sector dominates the Honduran economy. Electricity, gas, and water provision 
constitute another independent activity. Oil, commerce, and construction are also considered as three 
individual activities. As a result, activities and commodities are disaggregated into the following 
categories: bananas; coffee; sugar; mining; livestock; forestry; nontraditional exports; subsistence 
agriculture; oil; food, beverage, and tobacco manufactures; textile manufactures; paper manufactures; 
chemical manufactures; metal, mineral, and machinery manufactures; other manufactures; electricity, gas, 
and water; construction; commerce; hotel and restaurant services; transportation services; financial 
services; personal, social, and community services; and government services.  
 The intermediate demand total is disaggregated by commodities and activities, using a special 
tabulation provided by the Central Bank of Honduras. This tabulation provides the proportion of 
commodities that a given activity requires for its normal production. The disaggregation of commodities 
and activities for the 1997 micro SAM follows the same categorization of the system provided by the 
Central Bank except for a minor aggregation of formal and informal commerce into a single category. As 
for the disaggregation of domestic supply, the available information on the value added of each activity is 
added to its estimated intermediate demand to come up with a gross domestic supply per activity.  
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Table B.1. Activity and commodity categories for the social accounting matrix, Honduras, 1997 
Sectors and subsectors    Description 
1. Agriculture,  mining, fishing and 
livestocks 
  
1.a) Traditional exports  BAN_A  Banana 
 COF_A  Coffee 
 SUG_A  Sugar 
 MIN_A  Mining   
 LIV_A  Livestock 
 WOO_A  Wood   
1.b) Nontraditional exports  NTA_A  Non traditional exports 
1.c) Subsistence agricultural  SUB_A  Subsistence agricultural products 
1.d) Oil and derivatives  OIL_A  Oil 
2. Manufactures  ALI_A  Food, beverage and tobacco manufactures 
 TEX_A  Textile  manufactures 
 PAP_A  Paper  manufactures 
 CHE_A  Chemical  manufactures   
  MET_A  Metal, mineral and machinery manufactures 
 OMA_A  Other  manufactures 
3. Construction  CON_A  Construction 
4. Commerce  COM_A  Commerce 
5. Services  HOT_A  Hotel and restaurants   
 TPT_A  Transport,  storage and communication  
  FIN_A  Financial and insurance services  
  PER_A  Personal, social and  community  services 
 GOV_A  Government  services 
  OTH_A  Other services (real estate services)  
Source: Cuesta 2005. 
The factorial classification in the 1997 micro SAM distinguishes two production factors, labor 
and capital (Table B.2). The capital factor also includes land, given that estimating stocks and value 
added for land from existing EPH household surveys is a completely unreliable possibility. Labor factors 
are disaggregated into statistically meaningful categories as much as data permit. Labor is separated 
according to skill, occupation (wage earners versus self-employed), and gender. An intermediate skill (5–
9 schooling years) category is differentiated from low (0–4) and high (10 or more) skill levels. This 
distinction between unskilled and intermediate skilled labor and by gender could be useful in future 
policy simulations, but it played no part in the simulations reported in the paper, since we set the wages of 
the two labor categories for the two genders equal and assumed an excess supply of both factors. The 
combination of skill, occupation, and gender categories results in 12 labor factor types. Wage earners are 
defined as those receiving wages and salaries as their primary source of (labor) income. The remaining 
category brings together employers, self-employed, and unpaid relatives in a single category.   
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Table B.2. Labor categories, social accounting matrix, Honduras, 1997 
Labor Category  Skill Description   Schooling years   Occupation  Gender 
TUWM   Unskilled  0-4  Wage earner  Male 
TUNM Unskilled  0-4  Non  wage  earner  Male 
TIWM Semi-skilled  5-9  Wage  earner  Male 
TINM Semi-skilled  5-9  Non  wage  earner  Male 
TSWM Skilled  10+  Wage  earner  Male 
TSNM Skilled  10+  Non  wage  earner  Male 
TUWF Unskilled  0-4  Wage  earner  Female 
TUNF Unskilled  0-4  Non  wage  earner  Female 
TIWF Semi-skilled  5-9  Wage  earner  Female 
TINF Semi-skilled 5-9  Non  wage  earner  Female 
TSWF Skilled  10+  Wage  earner  Female 
TSNF Skilled  10+  Non  wage  earner  Female 
Source: Cuesta 2005. 
Note: The composition of the labor factor does not add up to 100 percent due to rounding errors. The total labor factor amounts to 
2,145,753 individuals.  
Formally, factors generate value added in the economy. The aggregated value added of labor is 
distributed among activities proportionally to their share in the labor income mass reported by EPH 1997. 
Despite this disaggregation of labor, value added is straightforward, the capital value added generated 
among activities is more troublesome. Honduras lacks estimates on capital stocks, let alone its 
distribution by activity. Following the stylization of Wobst (1998) using GTAP worldwide data, capital 
value added is first assigned among agricultural and nonagricultural activities. It is assumed that capital 
value added among agricultural activities amounts to 60 percent of total value added in these activities 
(Wobst 1998). For the remaining activities, capital value added represents only 40 percent of their total 
value added. Then these two subcategories of capital value added are further disaggregated, using 
worldwide average estimates on specific activities as reported in Wobst (1998). Although this option does 
not truly reflect a Honduras-specific distribution of capital value added (but a worldwide average instead), 
alternative options are regarded as nonsensical. Among such alternatives, one might have pro-rated the 
distributions of capital and labor value added alike. Also, the number of activities considered causes us to 
reject an arbitrary allocation of shares of capital value added, based on perceptions of what constitutes a 
capital intensive sector in the Honduran economy.  
As for households, these receive incomes from labor factors, an “operating surplus” from firms 
and remittances from the rest of the world. EPH 1997 data on labor incomes and the economic sector 
allow us to estimate the proportion of labor value added generated by each category of labor factor, and 
its reception among different categories of households. Firms’ transfers to households are distributed 
following the proportion of total interest and dividends of each household category, as reported in EPH 
1997. Similarly, remittances are assigned to each category of households according to the proportion of 
total remittances reported in the EPH 1997 survey.   
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From an expenditure point of view, households produce goods that are self-consumed, consume 
other goods and services, pay taxes, and save. The distribution of consumption by household category 
accrues from the ENIGH 1998/99 survey, assuming that the composition of consumption between 1997 
and the period of the survey did not change significantly. Given the low level of individuals reporting 
self-consumption in the ENIGH survey, the distribution of this category of household consumption is pro-
rated according to the share of each household category in final household consumption. Savings are 
estimated as the average difference between incomes and expenditures reported by each category of 
household in the ENIGH survey. The relative share of each household category in total savings is then 
applied to the 1997 macro SAM figure to obtain distribution of savings consistent with the micro SAM.  
As for the remaining transactions, taxes on sales are specified proportionally to the relative 
weight that each commodity represents on total domestic supply. Sales taxes as well as production taxes 
(except for special production taxes on cigarettes, beer, nonalcoholic drinks, and oil) are subject to 
balancing adjustments (see the next section). Income taxes are assigned among household categories on a 
proportional basis with respect to their reported average total income. Similarly, both private and public 
investments are assigned proportionally to the relative weight that each commodity has on total 
intermediate demand. Finally, transaction costs are distributed by commodities also in proportion to the 
share of each commodity in domestic supply, imports, and exports, respectively.  
Final Adjustments 
The entropy approach is used to obtain the final balanced SAM for this project (Robinson et al. 2000). 
However, in 1997 there was a large payment from enterprises to the rest of the world that is not consistent 
with national accounts data for preceding years and unlikely to represent future behavior. We eliminated 
this flow by 2005, which is one of the reasons that the model has a different trajectory between 1997 and 
2005 from the later growth path to 2020. 
The actual SAM is a square 87 x 87 matrix comprised of 24 activity accounts; 24 commodity 
accounts; 13 factor of production accounts (12 labor and 1 capital); 1 enterprise account; 6 government 
accounts (5 of which disaggregate tax receipts); 16 different types of households, depending on residence 
and gender head; a saving–investment account; an external account; and row–column sums. The actual 
matrix is available on the IFPRI website. www.ifpri.org/data/honduras02.asp    
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Table B.3. National Social Accounting Matrix used in the CGE model 
Receipts  Activities Commodities  Factors  Households Enterprises Government  Savings – 
investment 
Rest of the 
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  Transfers  to 
enterprises 












Factor taxes  Transfers, 
direct taxes 















Rest of the 
World 
(RoW) 
 Imports  Factor 
income to 
RoW 





























APPENDIX C:  A FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE DYNAMIC CGE MODEL 
Table C.1. The dynamic CGE model 
SETS 
SYMBOL Explanation SYMBOL  Explanation 
aA ∈   Activities  () cC M N C ∈ ⊂   Commodities not in CM 
() aA C E S A ∈⊂   Activities with a CES function at 
the top of the technology nest  () cC T C ∈ ⊂   Transaction service 
commodities 
() aA L E O A ∈⊂  
Activities with a Leontief 
Function at the top of the 
technology nest 
() cC X C ∈ ⊂   Commodities with domestic 
production  
cC ∈   Commodities  f F ∈   Factors 
() cC D C ∈⊂   Commodities with domestic 
sales of domestic output  iI N S ∈  
Institutions (domestic and 
rest of world) 
() cC D N C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CD  () i INSD INS ∈ ⊂   Domestic institutions 




() cC E N C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CE  () hH I N S D N G ∈ ⊂   Households 
() cC M C ∈⊂    
Imported commodities  fls F ∈   Factors with supply curve 
PARAMETERS 
c cwts   Weight of commodity c in the 
CPI  c qg  
Base-year quantity of 
government demand 
c dwts   Weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index  c qinv  
Base-year quantity of 
private investment demand 
ca ica   Quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a  if shif  
Share for domestic 
institution i in income of 
factor f 
' cc icd  
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per unit of c’ 
produced and sold domestically 
' ii shii  
Share of net income of i’ to 
i (i’ ∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
' cc ice  
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per exported unit of 
c’ 
a ta   Tax rate for activity a 
' cc icm  
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per imported unit of 
c’  
c te   Export tax rate 
a inta  
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
f tf   Direct tax rate for factor f 
a iva  
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
i tins  
Exogenous direct tax rate 
for domestic institution i 
i mps  
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i  i tins01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
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Table C.1. Continued 
PARAMETERS 
i mps01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
c tm   Import tariff rate 
c pwe   Export price (foreign currency)  c tq    Rate of sales tax 
c pwm   Import price (foreign currency)    if trnsfr   Transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
c qdst   Quantity of stock change  a tva   Rate of value-added tax for 
activity a 
f etals   Parameter in labor supply 
equation    
1a INVSHR   Capital shares  r PK   Price of capital 
fa DKAPS   Gross fixed capital formation  fa QF   Next period sectoral capital 
stock 
WFXAV   Average capital rental rate 
k deprate  
Capital stock depreciation 
rate 
 
Greek Letters    
a
a α   Efficiency parameter in the CES 
activity function 
t
c δ   CET function share parameter 
va
a α   Efficiency parameter in the CES 
value-added function 
va
fa δ   CES value-added function share parameter for 
factor f in activity a 
ac
c α   Shift parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
m
ch γ   Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
q
c α   Armington function shift parameter 
h
ach γ   Subsistence consumption of home commodity 
c from activity a for household h 
t
c α   CET function shift parameter  ac θ   Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
h
ach β  
marginal share of consumption 
spending on Home commodity c 
from activity a for household h 
a
a ρ        CES production function exponent 
m
ch β  
Marginal share of consumption 
spending on marketed commodity c 
for household h 
va
a ρ   CES value-added function exponent 
a
a δ   CES activity function share 
parameter 
ac
c ρ   Domestic commodity aggregation function 
exponent 
ac
ac δ   Share parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
q
c ρ   Armington function exponent 
q
c δ   Armington function share 
parameter 
t
c ρ   CET function exponent 
 VARIABLES 
CPI   Consumer price index   MPSADJ   Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for base) 
DTINS  
Change in domestic institution tax 
share  (= 0 for base; exogenous 
variable) 
f QFS   Quantity supplied of factor 
FSAV    Foreign savings (FCU)  TINSADJ  








adjustment factor  fa WFDIST  
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
IADJ   Investment adjustment factor     
DMPS  
Change in domestic institution 
savings rates (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
fa QF   Quantity demanded of factor f from 
activity a 
DPI  
Producer price index for 
domestically marketed output  c QG   Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
EG   Government expenditures  ch QH   Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
h EH   Consumption spending for 
household  ach QHA  
Quantity of household home consumption 
of commodity c from activity a for 
household h 
EXR 
Exchange rate (LCU  per unit of 
FCU)  a QINTA   Quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
GOVSHR
 
Government consumption share in 
nominal absorption  ca QINT   Quantity of commodity c as intermediate 
input to activity a 
GSAV   Government savings  c QINV   Quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
INVSHR  
Investment share in nominal 
absorption  c QM   Quantity of imports of commodity 
i MPS  
Marginal propensity to save for 
domestic non-government 
institution (exogenous variable) 
c QQ   Quantity of goods supplied to domestic 
market (composite supply) 
a PA   Activity price (unit gross revenue)  c QT    Quantity of commodity demanded as trade 
input 
c PDD   Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  a QVA   Quantity of (aggregate) value-added 
c PDS   Supply price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  c QX   Aggregated quantity of domestic output of 
commodity 
c PE   Export price (domestic currency)  ac QXAC    Quantity of output of commodity c from 
activity a 
a PINTA   Aggregate intermediate input price 
for activity a  TABS   Total nominal absorption 
c PM   Import price (domestic currency)  i TINS   Direct tax rate for institution i (i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
c PQ   Composite commodity price  ' ii TRII   Transfers from institution i’ to i (both in 
the set INSDNG) 
a PVA   Value-added price (factor income 
per unit of activity)  f WFREAL   Average real price of factor 
c PX   Aggregate producer price for 
commodity  f WF   Average price of factor 
ac PXAC   Producer price of commodity c for 
activity a  f YF   Income of factor f 
a QA   Quantity (level) of activity  YG   Government revenue 
c QD   Quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output  i YI   Income of domestic non-government 
institution 
c QE   Quantity of exports  if YIF   Income to domestic institution i from factor 
f 
       
  58
Table C.2. List of equations 
EQUATIONS 







1 cc c c c c
cC T
import import tariff exchange rate cost of trade
price price adjust LCUper inputs per
LCU FCU ment FCU import unit
PM pwm tm EXR PQ icm
∈
−
=⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=⋅⋅ + ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑






1 cc c c c c
cC T
export export tariff exchange rate cost of trade
price price adjust LCU per inputs per
LCU FCU ment FCU export unit
PE pwe te EXR PQ ice
∈
−
=⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=⋅⋅ − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑













PDD PDS PQ icd
∈
=+ ⋅
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢ ⎥ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
∑
  cC D ∈  







1 cc c c c c c
absorption




domestic sales quantity import quantity
sales tax
PQ tq QQ PDD QD PM QM ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅






  Absorption 
5 
cc cc cc
producer price domestic supply price export price
times marketed times times
output quantity domestic sales quantity export quantity
PX QX PDS QD PE QE ⋅= ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤
=+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
  cC X ∈   Marketed output 
value 
6 










⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑




aggregate  intermediate input cost
intermediate per unit of aggregate







⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑






Table C.2. Continued 
EQUATIONS 
# Equation  Domain  Description 
8 
()




net of taxes pricetimes
input pricetimes
times activity level quantity
quantity
PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦












⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
∑





Producer price index  prices times




⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑














aa a a a a
activity quantity of aggregate value added
level quantity aggregateintermediateinput CES
QA  QVA QINTA
ρρ ρ αδ δ
−− =⋅⋅ + −⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦






















QVA PINTA  =









⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
















⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦









demand for aggregate  activity 





⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦









Table C.2. Continued 
EQUATIONS 










a a fa fa
fF
quantity of aggregate factor









⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑











fa f a a a fa fa fa fa
fF
marginal cost of marginal revenue product
factor f in activity a of factor f in activity a







⋅= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
 
aA ∈  







average real wage average wage corrcected







⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
 


























f F ∈   Labor supply  
19 
ca ca a
intermediate demand  aggregate intermediate 
for commodity c  input quantity 






⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
aA ∈  




20   





of commodity c  of commodity c 
of commodity c 
from activity a from activity a
from activity a
QXAC QHA QA θ
∈
+= ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ += ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑
 
aA ∈  






Table C.2. Continued 
EQUATIONS 











production of production of
















⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑










c ac c ac ac ac ac
aA
marginal cost of com- marginal revenue product of
modity c from activity a commodity c from activity a







⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
 
aA ∈  









c cc tt t
cc c cc c
aggregate marketed export quantity, domestic
domestic output sales of domestic output CET
 =   + (1- ) QX QE QD
=
ρ ρρ αδ δ ⋅⋅ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 















supply ratio price ratio









⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 









sales of  domestic exports  for 
marketed
output for  c (CE CDN)]
domestic output
c (CD CEN)]



























cc c cc c
composite import quantity, domestic
supply use of domestic output
 =   + (1- ) QQ QM QD
=f
ρρ ρ αδ δ ⋅⋅ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 















demand ratio price ratio
QM PDD  =







⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 
( ) cC MC D ∈ ∩
 
Import-domestic 
demand ratio  
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Table C.2. Continued 
EQUATIONS 







composite marketed domestic imports  for 
supply output for  c CM CDN)]
cC D C M N ) ]

























() '' ' ' ' '
''
cc c cc c cc cc
cC
demand for sum of demands
transactions for imports, exports, 
services and domestic sales






⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑






fa f ff a
aA
sum of activity payments








⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑
  f F ∈   Factor income 
31 
() 1 if if f f r o w  f
income of  share of income income of  factor f
institution i  of factor f to (net of tax and 
from factor f institution i transfer to RoW)
YIF  = shif tf YF trnsfr EXR
=
⎡⎤ ⋅− ⋅ − ⋅ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
iI N S D ∈
 






ii f i i i g o v i r o w
fF iI N S D N G
transfers
transfers 
income of  factor from other domestic
from
institution i income non-government
governmen
institutions
YI  =  YIF TRII trnsfr CPI trnsfr EXR
=+ +
∈∈
++ ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥









⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 







'' ' ' ' ii ii i i i
share of net income  income of institution
transfer from
of institution i'  i', net of savings and
institution i' to i
transfered to i  direct taxes
T R I I  =  s h i i ( 1 - M P S )( 1 - T I N S )Y I
=
⋅⋅⋅





iI N S D N G ∈
 






() 11 hi h h h h
iI N S D N G
household income  household income, net of direct 
disposable for  taxes, savings, and transfers to 
consumption other non-government institutions



















Table C.2. Continued 
EQUATIONS 





ch h c c h ac ac h


















⋅− ⋅ − ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ +
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑∑ ∑
 
cC ∈  










ach h c c h ac ac h






for home commodity c income, 














⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑∑ ∑
 
aA ∈  
cC ∈  















QINV  = IADJ qinv
=
⋅
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦








demand for base-year government
commodity c consumption






⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦





ii f f a a a
iI N S D N G fF aA
a ac c ac c c c
aA c C M c C E







YG TINS YI tf YF tva PVA QVA
ta tm EXR te EX QA pwm QM pwe QE PA





=⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
+⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅



















⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
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40 
cc i g o v










⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑∑
    Government 
expenditures 




demand for supply of




⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
  f F ∈   Factor market 
42 
cc a c h c
aA hH
cc c
composite intermediate household government
supply use consumption consumption
fixed stock trade
investment change input use







⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣
∑∑
⎥ ⎦





cc r o w f c c i r o w





to RoW from RoW
pwm QM trnsfr pwe QE trnsfr FSA
=+ +
∈∈ ∈ ∈
⋅+ = ⋅ + +






RoW (in foreign 
currency) 
44  government government government
revenue expenditures savings
YG EG GSAV =+
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
    Government 
balance 
45 
() 10 1 0 1 i ii i
direct tax  base rate adjusted point change 
rate for  for scaling for  for selected
institution i selected institutions institutions
TINS tins TINSADJ tins DTINS tins =⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 






() 10 1 0 1 ii i i
savings  base rate adjusted point change 
rate for  for scaling for  for selected
institution i selected institutions institutions
MPS mps MPSADJ mps DMPS mps =⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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47 
() 1 ii i




ment savings savings savings
fixed stock
investment  change
MPS TINS YI GSAV EXR FSAV
PQ QINV PQ qdst
∈
∈∈
⋅− ⋅ + + ⋅ =
⋅+ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ++ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ + ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
∑∑





cc h a c a c h
hH cC aA c C h H









TABS PQ QH PXAC QHA
PQ QG PQ QINV PQ qdst










⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ++ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 









INVSHR TABS PQ QINV PQ qdst
∈∈
⋅= ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⋅=+ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑∑















⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ ⋅= ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑








f a  t a
f tf  t f  a  t
a f a' t
a
average capital weighted sum of  sectors' 





⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ =⋅ ⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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f a  t f t f a  t aa
f a  t a
f a' t f t
a
share of  share of  capital rental 





⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⋅ ⎜⎟ =⋅ ⋅ − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑    
Sector’s share 





c t c t
aa c
f a  t f a  t
f t
quantity of new  share of  total quantity of 





⎜⎟ Δ= ⋅ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
∑







f t c  t
c c' t
c
unit price  weighted market price 





⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑







f a  t
f a t+1 f  a t f
f a  t
average capital weighted sum of sectors' 





=⋅ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦










f a  t
a
f tf  t f
f t
average capital weighted sum of  sectors' 






⎜⎟ =⋅ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑





APPENDIX D:  THE MICROSIMULATION MODULE 
The basic input for the microsimulations of the poverty and distribution impact of the CAFTA scenarios 
is the 2004 national household survey entitled Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (MECOVI)
23 It 
comprises a national sample of 8,175 households. We use the solution of the CGE for 2005 to get the 
base-period distribution of the labor force across the households represented in the survey. We then use 
the random procedure described in Vos, Taylor, and Paes de Barros, 2002 and in more detail in Appendix 
J of Sanchez (2004) to get an estimate of the hypothetical level of poverty and distribution of income that 
would be observed in each of the CAFTA scenarios. Each microsimulation is repeated 100 times to get a 
mean estimate and a standard error, enabling us to make statements regarding the significance of the 
changes we found. The procedure is done sequentially, first for the change coming from the total growth 
in employment, holding skill structure and relative wages constant, and then sequentially allowing for 
changes in skill structure and relative wages.  
The poverty lines are taken from CEPAL (2005), adjusted from 2002 to 2004 by changes in 
inflation. The moderate line is adjusted by the change in the CPI, while the extreme poverty line is 
adjusted by the change in the price of food. The lines for the urban sector are 1,604 lempiras per month 
per person for the upper line and 772 for the lower. For the rural sector, the lines are 988 for the moderate 
line and 544 for extreme poverty. In 2004 US dollars, those lines translate to $88 per month for moderate 
urban poverty and $54 for extreme urban poverty, and $42 and $28, respectively, for rural poverty. We 
note that relative to other countries these poverty lines are quite high, particularly given that Honduras is a 
relatively poor country, which is one of the reasons that the level of poverty in all of our microsimulations 
is so high.  
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